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Nicholas Maxwell
I am absolutely delighted by the contributions to this volume. The
variety of topics discussed is astonishing. I am immensely grateful to all
the contributors for having taken the trouble to write these fascinating
and challenging essays. I am enormously grateful to Leemon McHenry
for all the work he has put into editing the book, and grateful too to
Michael Krausz for having suggested the book in the first place, and
initiated the project to produce it.
The philosophical problem which first came to haunt me was the
problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the
physical universe, aspects of which are discussed by Jeremy Shearmur,
Mat Iredale and David Hodgson in Part II. Then I became embroiled in
trying to understand how we could make rational sense of science, the
topic of essays by Karl Rogers and Leemon McHenry in Part III. Once I
had arrived at the idea that, because the basic aims of science are
profoundly problematic, science needs to try to improve its aims and
methods as it proceeds, I was led to generalize this idea to all of
academic inquiry and, in a way, to all of life. Thus did I stumble across
my “from knowledge to wisdom” argument, which is discussed in
diverse ways by Copthorne Macdonald, Steve Fuller, John Stewart,
Joseph Agassi, Margaret Boden and Donald Gillies in Part I. I propose
to discuss the essays in this order, as it seems to be a reasonably
coherent way of unfolding the themes under scrutiny.
But first I want to pay tribute to Alan Nordstrom’s marvellous sonnets
on wisdom. How extraordinary to find what I have been labouring to
say in tome after tome expressed here so lucidly and succinctly, and with
such eloquence. I am reminded of the poetry of George Herbert.
Nordstrom writes with absolute seriousness from the heart: he is one of a
handful of people scattered across the world who actively strive to put
what I would call “wisdom-inquiry” into practice in their teaching, as far
as bureaucracies and current orthodoxies permit. He has even,
heroically, attempted to get his university to devote itself to wisdom.The Human World in the Physical Universe
Jeremy Shearmur
I am enormously grateful to Jeremy Shearmur for the very generous
things he has to say about my work. I too remember vividly those
wonderful times we spent together with Larry Briskman in the late 60s,
arguing fiercely and roaring with laughter. We thought, in those far off
days that, in the fullness of time we would come together to create a
university department which would do philosophy as it ought to be done:
serious concern with fundamental problems at the outset; physics,
cosmology, biology, economics and politics on the curriculum as well as
“philosophy” as it is mostly understood these days; imaginative
speculation and fierce criticism; concern for problems of living, for
global problems; and lots of laughter. It never happened.
Shearmur criticizes my approach to the human world/physical
universe problem, and argues in support of Popper’s “three-worlds”
view. Shearmur makes it all sound very reasonable. He writes: “we
should initially be as metaphysically expansive as seems adequate to us
to do justice to the phenomena with which we are dealing. We then
attempt scientific reductions.” We do not presuppose, in other words,
that the mind can be reduced to the brain, biology to chemistry and
chemistry to physics. We attempt to explain the mind in terms of the
brain, biology in terms of chemistry, and chemistry in terms of physics,
and when we are successful it is a great scientific triumph – but we don’t
prejudge the matter. The proper scientific attitude is not to pretend to
success that has not been achieved.
Actually, as Shearmur recognizes, the issue between Popper and me
does not concern reductionism. I am as much an anti-reductionist (even
in principle) of the experiential to the physical as Popper is. What is at
issue, rather, is that I reject Popper’s interactionist, quasi-Platonic, three-
words view, and the chief argument which Popper deploys in support of
it.
Popper holds that there are three worlds: the physical universe; the
psychological world of conscious minds; and a quasi-Platonic world of
the content of theories, problems, arguments, ideas, and works of art.
This last world 3 interacts with world 1 (the physical universe) via world2 (the psychological world).
1 And in support of the existence, the
reality, of this interaction, Popper argues that a world 1 event, such as
the atomic explosion over Nagasaki on the 9
th August 1945, cannot be
explained and understood without reference to scientific theories, in
particular theories of nuclear physics. The explosion would not have
occurred if certain theories in nuclear physics had not been previously
discovered. Here, it seems, is a decisive case of a world 3 idea
influencing a world 1 event via world 2. In order to explain the
explosion, it will be necessary to refer to world 3 entities – theories of
nuclear physics – which means no purely physical explanation, referring
to the physical universe only, could conceivably, even in principle,
suffice.
2
But this is not quite the knock-down argument that Popper takes it to
be. Instead of refuting, it just ignores an alternative account which
makes no reference whatsoever to quasi-Platonic “ideas” which,
supposedly, interact with the minds of people. We may adopt
experiential physicalism, the anti-reductionist view I have expounded in
section 6 of chapter one, and have argued for in some detail elsewhere.
3
Having adopted experiential physicalism, we may take the view that two
quite different kinds of explanation of the Nagasaki explosion are (in
principle) possible. On the one hand there is the physical explanation:
the true theory of everything, T, plus a precise specification of the
1 See K. Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), chs. 3 and
4; K. Popper and J. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (London: Springer, 1977), Part I,
chs. P2 and P3.
2 I heard Popper spell out this specific version of the argument in a lecture he gave
at Imperial College London. Other versions of the argument can be found in the
works cited in note 1. The atomic bomb is mentioned in this context in K. Popper
and J Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, op. cit., p. 47.
3 Experiential physicalism was expounded in my first three published papers,
“Physics and Common Sense”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16
(1966), pp. 295-311; “Can there be Necessary Connections between Successive
Events?”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (1968), pp. 1-25; and
“Understanding Sensations”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1968), pp.
127-146. It was further developed in my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1
st ed.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp, 181-189, 201-205 and ch. 10; 2
nd ed. (London:
Pentire Press, 2007), pp. 205-213, 224-227 and ch. 10. See also my The Human
World in the Physical Universe ((Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield,
2001), pp. 88-89 and chs. 5-8; and especially my “Popper’s Paradoxical Pursuit of
Natural Philosophy”, in J. Shearmur and G. Stokes (eds.) Cambridge Companion to
Popper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), section 7.physical state of the earth and its environment at some time prior to the
explosion, together entail a specification of the Nagasaki explosion and,
in this way, explain the explosion. This provides a comprehensive,
detailed explanation of all the physical phenomena associated with the
explosion, but leaves everything experiential and human associated with
these phenomena undescribed and unexplained (except as physical
processes going on in conscious brains). For this we need to resort to
personalistic descriptions and explanations, couched in terms of
intentions, plans, desires, ideas, perceptions, feelings and actions of
people. A personalistic explanation enables one to know what it would
be like to be the other person, seeing, experiencing, thinking, feeling
what the other person sees, experiences, etc. The historical account of
the exploding of the bomb – discovery of the nuclear chain reaction, the
Manhattan Project, the war, the political decision to drop the bomb –
would be made up of, and would presuppose, a multitude of
personalistic explanations. It would render intelligible the dropping of
the bomb (in so far as it can be rendered intelligible) in human terms, in
terms of the plans, motives and actions of people, in a way in which the
purely physical explanation, however complete in its own terms, could
not. This historical, personalistic account would refer to apparent world
3 entities, such as theories, propositions, and arguments, but would not
require anything to exist other than what can be accommodated within
experiential physicalism.
4 There are, in other words, on this view, no
Popperian world 3 entities that interact with world 1 via world 2.
The crucial feature of this view is that personalistic explanations are
intellectually genuine, and compatible with, but irreducible to, even in
principle, physical explanations. They are irreducible to physical
explanations, not because they explain physical events that cannot be
(fully) explained physically, but because they explain, or render
comprehensible in a way different from the way physical explanations
explain.
Popper argues that, in order to make sense of world 1 events, such as
explosions of atomic bombs, we have to acknowledge that world 3
entities – physical theories – interact with world 1 via world 2. The
physical universe is, in other words, “causally open” as Popper and
Shearmur put it. What this argument ignores is that the physical
universe may be closed causally but open explanatorily. Granted
experiential physicalism, physical explanations explain everything in
4 See my “Popper’s Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy”, op. cit., section 7.only a highly restricted, specific kind of way. In particular, no physical
explanation of the Nagasaki explosion, however complete, could even in
principle render this horrific event intelligible in human or personalistic
terms. But this does not mean, as Popper supposes, that world 3 entities
exist and interact with world 1 via world 2.
At one point Shearmur asserts that, according to my view “what
happens in the physical world is … to be understood purely in physical
terms”. No. Physical events caused in part by human intervention could
be explained in only a restricted kind of way by physical theory; in order
to make human sense of such events, personalistic explanations are
required, which are compatible with but not reducible to physical
explanation.
It is important to note that, in order to demolish Popper’s argument,
all that is needed is the counter example of experiential physicalism as a
possibility. It is not required to establish that experiential physicalism is
true.
We have before us, then, two rival views.
5 Both face problems. As
Shearmur points out, experiential physicalism faces the problem: How
can there be authentic free will if everything occurs in accordance with
physical law? Popper’s view faces the severe problem: How can
Darwinian evolution result in (a) the creation of a whole new realm of
world 3 entities, quite distinct from the physical universe, which (b)
interact with the physical universe via conscious minds? Interactionism
amounts to postulating poltergeistic events in the brain, more discreet
than those which hurl furniture about in horror films, but otherwise not
different in kind, and just as implausible when viewed from the
standpoint of modern science.
Shearmur rather glosses over the very severe difficulties that Popper’s
view faces, but pounces on the chief difficulty faced by my view. He
says, for example “as for ourselves and our activities, and the impact that
we make on the physical world, everything would have been the same,
had we been zombies”. My reply is that unconscious zombies that
imitate human actions are, perhaps, a logical possibility, but they are not
possible in fact in our world. Any beings with brains sufficiently
sophisticated to create, not just atomic bombs, but the marvels that we
create – great works of art, science, loving relationships, liberal
democracies – must be, in our world, conscious. Purely physical
5 I ignore, in the present context, all the other rival possible views. These are
critically assessed in my The Human World in the Physical Universe, op. cit., ch. 4.explanations of these things will refer to human intentions, plans,
imaginings, but only as physical phenomena, the physical aspects of
mental or brain processes. However, I defer responding properly to
Shearmur’s charge that experiential physicalism cannot do justice to free
will till I come to discuss free will in some detail in connection with
David Hodgson’s contribution below. My response to Hodgson will
also be my response to Shearmur.
Despite Shearmur’s critique, experiential physicalism still seems to
me to be overwhelmingly superior to Popper’s three worlds view.
But what are we to make of Shearmur’s apparently modest proposal
that we should, initially, be as metaphysically expansive as we seem to
need to be, to do justice to the phenomena, and then attempt scientific
reductions (thus not presupposing such reductions will succeed)? Is not
this open-minded attitude eminently reasonable? I have two comments
to make.
First, much depends on whether one adopts standard empiricism (SE)
or aim-oriented empiricism (AOE). AOE implies that physicalism is a
relatively secure part of current theoretical (conjectural) scientific
knowledge. AOE thus implies that we have good theoretical scientific
grounds for not being metaphysically, or ontologically, expansive
(except in the realm of physical entities perhaps). There are, according
to AOE and physicalism, no non-physical entities knocking about in the
universe interacting with the physical world. SE, on the other hand,
implies that physicalism is not a part of current scientific knowledge
(since it is a metaphysical thesis that is incompatible with current
accepted physical theory). Accept SE, and science becomes much more
tolerant about the kinds of entity that may exist in the world.
Second, whatever scientific theory tells us, we must, of course,
continue to be highly critical of it. The falsifiable, and the metaphysical
(i.e. unfalsifiable) accepted theories of science must be subjected to
sustained attempted criticism and falsification. This may well involve
entertaining the possibility that entities exist that are prohibited by
current theory. In other words, a healthy Popperian critical attitude can
do full justice to Shearmur’s – and Popper’s – plea for metaphysical
expansiveness, and lack of prejudgement. (This is to use Popper to
refute Popper.)Mathew Iredale
Mathew Iredale begins his lucid essay by attributing to me two points
that I do indeed hold: first, that we should see philosophical problems
concerning free will as a central part of the more general and complex
problem of understanding how our human world, imbued with
consciousness, free will, meaning and value, can be embedded in the
physical universe; and second, that this latter “human world/physical
universe” problem is perhaps the fundamental problem of philosophy,
even our fundamental problem per se. He then expresses one or two
doubts as to whether my proposed reformulation is so very different
from the traditional free will/determinism problem, but goes on to
consider implications that special relativity
6, evolution, neuroscience,
genetics, psychological studies of rationality and manipulation (all
aspects of science) have for our ideas about free will.
A few comments. In chapter 1 of this volume I suggest that our
fundamental problem – philosophical, theoretical, and practical – might
be put like this: How can life of value best flourish in the real world? I
intend this to encompass both the practical problem “How can I, or we,
realize what is of most value, potentially, in the circumstances of my, or
our, life?”, and the philosophical and theoretical problem of knowledge
and understanding “How does our human world fit into the physical
universe?”. The latter is, perhaps, our fundamental problem of
knowledge and understanding, but not quite our fundamental problem
per se.
7
6 Iredale says that “relativity does not appear to give the traditionalists any reason to
abandon their formulation of the free will problem in terms of determinism”. I
would have thought one should draw exactly the opposite conclusion, for two
reasons. First, in so far as relativity creates a problem for free will, this is an
example of science creating a problem, relativity being a scientific theory. Second,
relativity, in so far as it implies a space-time, “block universe” view, can be taken to
imply that the future is fixed and determined; but this is what might be called
“ontological determinism”, quite different from the “predictive determinism” of
orthodox discussions of the free will problem. Special relativity and ontological
determinism are entirely compatible with the basic laws of the universe being
probabilistic, predictive determinism being false.
7 Iredale is quite right to quote me as saying, in a note, that the human
world/physical universe problem is our fundamental problem. However, in the
same note, I do say that it is our “fundamental problem of understanding”: see my
The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and
Evolution, op. cit., p. 17, note 1.In this age of almost lunatic specialization, it seems to me vital that
philosophers – and indeed all of us – should persistently remind
specialized academics that there are profoundly important general,
fundamental problems that cut across conventional disciplinary
boundaries, rationality requiring that there be a persistent interplay
between specialized and fundamental problem-solving.
8 The primary
task of philosophy is to keep alive an awareness of the existence of these
fundamental problems – an awareness of the point that we cannot help
but give answers to them, implicitly or explicitly, in our science and the
way we think, in our institutions, our values and the way we live, our
answers all being more or less inadequate and, as a result affecting
adversely our thought and lives. If philosophers can also encourage
imaginative and critical attempts to improve answers to our fundamental
problems, so much the better. Philosophy betrays its central task –
betrays reason and humanity – if it becomes, what it mostly is these
days, yet another specialized discipline alongside other such disciplines.
A part of the reason for formulating the free will problem in such a
way that it becomes an important component of the more general
“human world/physical universe” problem is that this clarifies the nature
of the problem, brings to the fore aspects of the problem that may
otherwise be neglected, and may even be required as a first step towards
solving the problem. Iredale, as we have seen, indicates a number of
ways in which science has implications for our ideas about free will
which have nothing to do with determinism – implications which may be
missed if attention is restricted to determinism. But there are additional
points to be made.
The two formulations we are concerned with are:
The determinism formulation: How can we have free will if determinism
is true?
The science formulation: How can we have free will – a vital aspect of
life of value – if what science tells us about the world is true?
Given the science formulation it is at once clear that a major part of
the problem is to decide what we should take science to be telling us
about the world. This will depend, in part, on what philosophy of
science we accept. Given standard empiricism, it is not clear what
science does tell us about the ultimate nature of physical reality.
8 This is the message of my “Science, Reason, Knowledge and Wisdom: A
Criticism of Specialism”, Inquiry 23 (1980), pp. 19-81.Granted aim-oriented empiricism,
9 however, science tells us that we live
in a physicalistic universe – physicalism being a rather secure part of
scientific knowledge.
10 The free will problem becomes all the more
severe – physicalism placing harsh constraints on the possibility of free
will.
Again, given the science formulation, it is clear that a major part of
the problem is to understand how there can be free will if the real
explanation for all our thoughts, decisions and actions is a purely
scientific one, indeed a purely physical explanation. If we are to have
free will, surely rationalistic or personalistic explanations of what we
decide and do must be true, must be couched in terms of our desires,
thoughts, decisions, reasons for action, and must make these responsible
for our actions in the kind of way required for free will. But how could
such rationalistic, freedom-ascribing explanations of human actions be
true if purely physical explanations suffice to predict and explain, in
principle, everything that goes on? Could both kinds of explanation be
true simultaneously? These issues concerning explanation become
crucial to the free will problem.
Putting the free will problem into the context of the “human
world/physical universe” problem brings two other matters to the fore.
The first of these is that the free will problem cannot sensibly be tackled
independently of the mind/body problem. The way the problem is
formulated and the kind of answers to be sought will differ profoundly
depending on whether some kind of dualist position is adopted, or a
view which identifies the mind with the brain. The second point is that
ideas about free will cannot be separated from ideas about what is of
value. In part this is because free will is something we, correctly, judge
to be inherently of value. Free will may be given a range of meanings,
some perhaps more obviously compatible with determinism or
physicalism than others. The question that really matters is this: In how
valuable a sense of free will do we, or can we, have it given
determinism, or physicalism? Values also arise in connection with
9 For characterizations of standard and aim-oriented empiricism, see this volume,
chapter 1, section 4.
10 Physicalism, as understood here and in what follows, is the thesis that the
universe is physically comprehensible, it being such that the yet-to-be-discovered
true physical “theory of everything” is unified. Physicalism is of course a
conjecture, like all items of theory in physics; it is, however, according to aim-
oriented empiricism, more secure than even our best physical theories – quantum
theory or general relativity.questions about the authentic self. One way in which one’s free will can
be diminished is to have one’s authentic self taken over by a false self as
a result of brainwashing, indoctrination, or becoming in thrall to another.
But how is the authentic self to be distinguished from a false self? At
some point value judgements must be brought in to answer this question.
A person is his real, authentic, true self if what is best, of most value, in
this person’s character, is in command. Formulating the free will
problem as a part of the “human world/physical universe” problem
rather naturally brings these value aspect to the fore, as this latter
problem is centrally concerned with questions about how what is of
value can exist (and flourish) embedded in the physical universe.
There is a further point. So far reasons have been given for
reformulating the traditional free will/determinism problem so that
“determinism” is replaced with “physicalism”. But grounds can also be
given for replacing “free will” with “wisdom” – conceived of as the
capacity and active desire to realize what is of value in life, for oneself
and others. This yields a stronger, more fundamental version of the
problem, as long as we hold free will to be a necessary component of
wisdom. It could of course be argued that what is of value may be
achieved by someone acting compulsively, and thus without free will. A
person might be a compulsive philanthropist, perhaps, or a compulsive
creator of great art or science. But let us demand, by fiat as it were that,
for wisdom, realization of value must be done freely. In this case, the
wisdom/physicalism problem encompasses the free will/physicalism
problem, in that solving the former solves the latter as well, but not vice
versa. It is of course true that we may act freely but not wisely;
nevertheless, if we can solve the problem of how wise acting is possible
given physicalism, we can almost certainly solve the problem of how
free, unwise acting is possible.
11 This wisdom reformulation is rather
natural to adopt granted that one takes the “human world/physical
universe” problem as fundamental.
The point is now this. Formulate the free will problem as an integral
part of the more fundamental “human world/physical universe” problem,
11 It might be objected that the free will/physicalism problem is already hard
enough; why should we embed it in the even more difficult, severe problem of how
wise acting is possible given physicalism? The answer is that we need to be clear
about the problems that confront us, and sometimes embedding a problem in a more
fundamental one, in this way, provides the key to solving the problem. I believe
this is the case here.and it is more or less obvious that the above considerations, having to do
with the philosophy of science, the conflict between different
explanations, the mind-body problem, values, and wisdom are all highly
relevant to solving the problem. Formulate the problem as a question
about free will and determinism however, and it is not clear that any of
the above considerations are relevant.
Iredale makes the excellent point that a Darwinian perspective on free
will implies that what free will we have today must have evolved
gradually, its early manifestations existing, no doubt, in pre-human
mammalian life. This Darwinian viewpoint speaks strongly on behalf of
compatibilism. It is difficult to see how incompatibilist free will could
have emerged gradually. The view would have to be, presumably, that
early life was devoid of any hint of incompatibilist free will until,
abruptly, at some instant, incompatibilist free will burst upon the scene –
something of a miracle for ordinary Darwinian mechanisms of evolution
to engineer!
Iredale also stresses that this gradualist Darwinian view implies that
we possess only a certain amount of free will, it being possible, no
doubt, for us to increase the degree that we possess. A fundamental
problem may be that of discovering how we can learn to increase our
free will. I would only add that there is here, in my view, an additional
reason for concentrating on wisdom rather than free will. Enhancing
wisdom increases – by definition – our capacity to realize what is of
value, whereas enhancing free will does not. (What I take to be a really
urgent and fundamental problem “How can humanity learn a bit more
wisdom?” turns out to be much more closely related to the free will
problem than one might at first sight realize.)
David Hodgson
I am immensely grateful to David Hodgson for the generous things he
says about my book The Human World in the Physical Universe.
Hodgson and I agree about much. But there is one fundamental point of
disagreement: unlike me, Hodgson holds that free will and (experiential)
physicalism are incompatible. Hodgson produces some searching
criticisms of my compatibilist views which I shall do my best to rebut.
Hodgson argues that I have not shown that science has established the
truth of physicalism. I agree. All theoretical knowledge in physics is
conjectural. What I do claim to have shown is that physicalism is a
basic tenet of scientific knowledge, more secure than any physicaltheory (but still a conjecture). The grounds for accepting physicalism, in
essence are, first, that persistent preference given to unified physical
theories means that physics makes a persistent metaphysical assumption
concerning unity and, second, given that some such assumption must be
made, the best one to adopt is the one (a) which accords best with the
thesis that the universe is perfectly comprehensible in some way or
other, and (b) which is the most empirically fruitful, in the sense that it
promises to support the most empirically progressive research
programme, and has actually supported the most empirically progressive
research programme.
12 I argue that the thesis which best satisfies (a) and
(b) is physicalism.
13 Hodgson supports a rival dualist, interactionist
metaphysical thesis which might be called physicalism(H). Hodgson
argues that physicalism(H) accords just as well with modern science as
physicalism does, the former differing from the latter only in asserting
that some physical processes occurring in conscious brains are
influenced by “the non-physical aspect of reality”.
But physicalism(H) fails quite drastically to satisfy requirement (a) for
acceptability. Any “theory of everything”, T(H), compatible with
physicalism(H), must be vastly more complex, disunified, and thus non-
explanatory, than any “theory of everything”, T, compatible with
physicalism. For, unlike T, T(H) will have to specify extraordinarily
complex physical states of affairs – states of conscious brains – that
constitute the conditions under which the non-physical interacts with the
physical. Or, put another way, in order to specify physical conditions
under which that part of T(H) that constitutes a purely physical theory
fails to yield correct predictions (because of non-physical interactions),
extraordinarily complex physical states of affairs will have to be
specified. This means that T(H) must be vastly less explanatory than T,
and thus horribly at odds with the thesis that the universe is perfectly
comprehensible in some way or other. Whereas T asserts that the same
laws govern all phenomena everywhere, the physical part of T(H) asserts
12 For a more detailed explication of empirical fruitfulness along these lines see my
The Comprehensibility of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),
pp. 178-179; and my Is Science Neurotic? (London: Imperial College Press, 2004),
p. 156.
13 See my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1
st ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 218-
230; 2
nd ed. (London: Pentire Press, 2007), pp. 241-253, 358-360 and 400-430. See
also my The Comprehensibility of the Universe, op. cit., chs.3-5; and Is Science
Neurotic?, op. cit., appendix, section 6.that the same laws govern all phenomena everywhere except for some
extremely complex phenomena occurring in conscious brains.
It seems to me doubtful, too, that physicalism(H) satisfies (b) as well
as physicalism does. Were we to allow that it does, we would have to
allow, too, it would seem, that endlessly many other theses analogous to
physicalism(H) satisfy (b) as well as physicalism does – theses which
postulate that, in addition to the physical world, there is a non-physical
one which interacts with physical states of affairs but in a way which has
not yet been observed. This would include theses which postulate that
such interactions occur in the future, and are so powerful that tables and
chairs are pushed around, even mountains, planets and stars. Once we
allow that views such as these are as empirically fruitful as physicalism
(in the sense indicated above), the whole idea of any version of
physicalism being empirically fruitful seems to disappear.
This point can be made in a slightly different way as follows. Once it
is regarded as scientifically acceptable to hold that there is a non-
physical world interacting with the physical one then, whenever physical
phenomena are discovered that are inexplicable on the basis of current
physical theory, it would always be scientifically acceptable to hold that,
here, the non-physical world is interacting with the physical world. This
would stultify the search for physical explanations for the recalcitrant
phenomena. What this shows, decisively in my view, is that Hodgson’s
view – physicalism(H) – is not as scientifically acceptable as
physicalism. Far from being scientifically fruitful, if accepted it would
render equally acceptable analogous views which would stultify
scientific progress. (A number of views analogous to physicalism(H) –
such as versions of vitalism – have been put forward at various times:
none have proved empirically fruitful.)
I might add that if physicalism is true, then all dynamical theories
which apply only to restricted ranges of phenomena must be false. It
follows at once that if physics proceeds by developing a succession of
theories, each of which applies to a greater range of phenomena than its
predecessors, but none of which applies to all phenomena, then physics
will proceed from one false theory to another. That physics has
developed in this way does not in any way undermine the idea that
physicalism may be true (as Hodgson seems to suggest at one point). On
the contrary, this is just the way physics ought to make progress, if
physicalism is true.Hodgson goes on to argue that there are grounds for holding that
physicalism is false. His argument, if I have understood it, might be
boiled down to this. Reasoning involved in doing physics is not
algorithmic. But if physicalism is true,
14 it must be algorithmic, since
thought processes involved in developing a new physical theory would
all occur in accordance with precise physical law. Hence physicalism is
false.
What is wrong with this argument is the idea that if physics is done in
a physicalistic universe then all reasoning involved must be algorithmic.
Consider Einstein pondering the problems that led him to formulate
special relativity. We might simplify things drastically, and assume it
took him two hours to work it out (actually he pondered the issues for
some ten years). And again to simplify things, let us assume
deterministic physicalism. Then, given a precise specification of the
relevant initial conditions, IC, plus the true deterministic physical
“theory of everything”, T, a physical specification of the marks on paper
produced when Einstein wrote down the special relativity follow
logically. Does this mean that the discovery of special relativity can be
specified by means of an algorithm? Not at all. This predictive task
would, in practice, be utterly impossible to perform. First, it would be
quite impossible to obtain IC – which would have to include a
specification of the physical state of Einstein’s brain and body, and his
environment (strictly speaking including a region of two light hours
distance). IC would have to be obtained with absolute precision; the
slightest inaccuracy in the specification of the state of a molecule in
Einstein’s brain would be liable to throw the whole prediction out. The
instantaneous states of even the simplest physical systems cannot be
known with absolute precision. Specifying the state of Einstein’s brain
is entirely out of the question. Secondly, solving the equations of T for
such a system is forever out of the question. It is very likely that, if ever
we do discover the true theory of everything, we will only be able to
arrive at approximate solutions to the equations for even the simplest of
14 Hodgson argues that if physicalism is true there can be no free will. Elsewhere I
have argued almost the opposite: if physicalism is true, we have strong grounds for
holding we do have free will. For if physicalism is true, then the highly worthwhile
project of theoretical physics has met with great success. But we should think of
free will as the capacity to achieve what is of value. But if physicalism is true, we
have achieved something of great value, what has been achieved in physics: hence
we must have free will. See my From Knowledge to Wisdom, op. cit., 1
st ed., pp.
273-274; 2
nd ed., pp. 294-295.systems. As someone wittily observed, given Newtonian theory there is
no general solution to the three body problem, given classical
electrodynamics the one body problem poses problems, and for quantum
electrodynamics even the zero body problem cannot be precisely solved.
As physical theories have encompassed broader and broader ranges of
phenomena, their equations have become ever more nearly impossible to
solve.
An algorithm is a mechanical procedure for solving a problem. And a
mechanical procedure is something which “can be given in a finite set of
instructions which are executed in a stepwise manner, without appeal to
random processes or ingenuity”.
15 Not by the remotest stretch of the
imagination could processes involved in predicting Einstein creating
special relativity be regarded as algorithmic. No finite set of instructions
are possible which would suffice to perform the predictive task. Endless
infinities would be involved in obtaining the precise state of a molecule,
let alone the state of a neuron, or of Einstein’s brain. Endless infinities
would be involved, too, in solving the relevant equations. Any attempt
to get information about the state of Einstein’s brain would disrupt and
damage what was being sought. And in addition, the physical
prediction, if it could be made, would predict the marks made by
Einstein on paper, but not what these marks can be interpreted to assert,
namely special relativity. There are, in short, endless reasons for
holding that predicting Einstein discovering special relativity, given
deterministic physicalism, is not algorithmic.
Hodgson does, however, have another argument. Doing physics
requires consciousness. But if physicalism is true, “conscious
experiences can’t make a positive contribution to determining what
happens, beyond that made by associated physical events”. Hence
physicalism must be false.
But what this argument fails to take into account is that (according to
the view I uphold) relevant physical processes going on in Einstein’s
brain are (contingently identical to) Einstein’s conscious experiences.
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Special relativity requires consciousness for its production (let us
assume). Some of the physical processes that lead to marks on paper
15 T. Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), p. 21.
16 See my The Human World in the Physical Universe, op. cit., appendix 2, for a
refutation of Saul Kripke’s claim that such a contingent identity (with rigid
designators) is not possible.that can be correctly interpreted to constitute the formulation and
discovery of special relativity are conscious experiences, and if they
were not, special relativity would not have resulted.
But – Hodgson may protest – if it is the physical processes that result
in the writing down of special relativity, what possible role can
consciousness have? Consciousness can add nothing to the physics!
To this I reply: but the physics, structured and functioning in the way
that it is in Einstein’s brain, is consciousness. Hodgson’s objection may
well be lethal when directed against epiphenomenalism, since that view
distinguishes brain processes and conscious experiences and gives no
causal role to the latter. But that is not my view. I defend a version of
the brain process theory according to which conscious experiences are
(contingently identical to) brain processes, and not something distinct
from them. What we are aware of, when we are aware of our inner
experiences, is what might be termed the control aspect of processes
going on in our brains – the role these processes have in controlling, or
guiding, our actions. The control aspect operates by means of the
physical or causal properties of these processes, and the causal and
structural properties of the brain in which they occur. Einstein’s
perceptions, thoughts, desires, intentions, beliefs, decisions to act, are all
brain processes – ultimately physical processes: what he is aware of is
the control aspect of these processes – the capacity of these processes to
produce his actions. Thus Einstein’s conscious experiences, being
physical processes, have a direct, causal role in producing special
relativity, and Einstein is, in a sense, aware of this causal role, in a
somewhat opaque way, in being aware of the control aspect of the
relevant brain processes.
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Finally, Hodgson argues that experiential physicalism (the view I
defend) faces a fatal difficulty when it comes to evolution – a difficulty
his interactionist view effortlessly overcomes. Actually, I think the
matter is all the other way round. It is Hodgson’s view, not mine, that
faces a severe problem when confronted by evolution.
Natural selection operates on the capacity to survive and reproduce.
This capacity, as far as animals are concerned, has a lot to do with the
way animals act in their given environment. But if physicalism is
correct, action is produced by physical processes occurring in the brain.
It is this that natural selection would operate on, not any subjective
sensations, desires or feelings that may accompany these physical
17 See ibid., chs. 5, 6 and 8. See also my Cutting God in Half (forthcoming), ch. 7.processes. Hence there can be no Darwinian explanation for the
evolution of sentience and consciousness.
From my point of view, this argument fails for the same reason that
Hodgson’s argument above fails. It might be successful against
epiphenomenalism, but it does not work against the version of the brain
process theory I wish to defend. Natural selection operates on the
control aspects of the brain: this is what matters, in that it is this which
produces and guides action. But sentient and conscious aspects of brain
processes are control aspects. They are control aspects that have
acquired these amazing features of sentience and consciousness – but in
becoming sentient and conscious they do not in any way whatsoever lose
their control status or character. Thus natural selection, in operating on
control aspects of brain processes operates too on those control aspects
that happen to be sentient and conscious. Once one appreciates that
conscious inner experiences are (contingently identical to) brain
processes, the difficulty Hodgson sees disappears. I must add, however
that, in my view, something like a Darwinian explanation of the
evolution of sentience and consciousness is only possible if Darwinian
theory is modified to include the evolution of the mechanisms of
evolution, so that, as evolution proceeds, purposiveness is gradually
incorporated into these mechanisms.
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The interactionist view that Hodgson upholds does, however, in my
view, face a serious problem in connection with evolution – as I have
already indicated in my response to Iredale’s essay.
I want to conclude my discussion of Hodgson’s contribution by
emphasizing again that, despite our sharp disagreement about free will,
there is much that we agree about, over a wide range of issues. I am
highly appreciative of the clarity and generosity of his exposition of my
views, and the cogency of his criticisms, which have forced me to think
again about how free will is possible if physicalism is true.
Philosophy of Science
Karl Rogers
Karl Rogers gives a terrific brief account of my “philosophy for
science”, as he puts it, but then makes a number of remarks that I find
puzzling.
18 See ibid., ch. 7.At one point he suggests that, for me, the task of philosophy of
science is to explain “scientific success and progress”. This is too
strong. Rather, I take the task to be – as Rogers also reports – to explain
how scientific progress is possible. (It seems impossible either because
we demand the impossible of science – such as that it delivers verified
knowledge – or because we assume unworkable methods for science –
such as that theories be judged solely on the basis of empirical success
and failure.) In my first work on scientific method (published long ago
in 1972), I formulated the task of the methodologist like this. He must
“specify (a) a fundamental aim, or group of aims, for science, and (b) a
set of methodological rules …[and] then assert:-
(1) The specified aim is the most worthwhile aim for science that is, as
far as we know, in principle realizable.
(2) The specified methodological rules give us the best hope of realizing
the specified aim.”
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This could be improved but is on the right lines. Even if aims and
methods are specified that lead to acceptable propositions (1) and (2),
this falls short of explaining “scientific success and progress”.
Rogers goes on to refer to my “uncritical acceptance of ‘the empirical
success’ of science”. I balk a little at “uncritical”, having launched, over
the years, a number of criticisms of science, from neuroscience,
20 aspects
of the whole endeavour
21, to orthodox quantum theory.
22 The latter, I
have argued, is not just false; it is unacceptable as a theory, because of
its severe disunity. I have argued that we have good grounds for holding
all fundamental physical theories are false (as I have already indicated in
19 N. Maxwell, “A Critique of Popper’s Views on Scientific Method”, Philosophy of
Science 39 (1972), p. 133. For an improved formulation see my “The Rationality of
Scientific Discovery”, Philosophy of Science 41 (1974), pp. 139-140.
20 See my “Methodological Problems of Neuroscience”, in D. Rose and V.G.
Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex (Chichester: Wiley and Sons, 1985), pp.
11-21.
21 See my What's Wrong With Science? (Frome: Bran's Head Books, 1976); From
Knowledge to Wisdom, op. cit.; Is Science Neurotic?, op. cit.
22 Papers of mine that criticize orthodox quantum theory (and seek to develop a
better version of the theory that differs empirically from the orthodox version)
stretch over 36 years, from the first, “A New Look at the Quantum Mechanical
Problem of Measurement”, American Journal of Physics 40, 1972, pp. 1431-1435,
to the most recent, “Is the Quantum World Composed of Propensitons?”, in M.
Suárez (ed.) Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics, (Boston: Synthese
Library, 2008).my response to Hodgson). I hold that all scientific knowledge is
irredeemably conjectural in character. And I have been highly critical of
what “the empirical” should mean, at the most fundamental level, in
social science, in that I hold social inquiry should take human
experience, what we enjoy and suffer, as basic in assessing proposals for
action. So I don't think it is quite right to say I accept that science is
empirically successful uncritically, or that I “preclude any possibility of
criticism of the nature of ‘the empirical’ and the criteria for ‘empirical
success’”.
I am puzzled, too, by Rogers’ assertion that I assume standard
empiricism in my “interpretation of the nature of ‘the empirical’”. Quite
to the contrary, I have made it abundantly clear, in a number of places
that, in my view, metaphysical assumptions are implicit in empirical
assertions of science (which contradicts standard empiricism). For
example, the point is stated quite clearly on pages 209-210, and on page
270, note 8, of my The Comprehensibility of the Universe. Elsewhere I
declare “Even humble particular statements about our immediate
surroundings contain presuppositions about the entire cosmos”.
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These misunderstandings vitiate Rogers’ subsequent criticisms of my
views.
Rogers correctly says that I agree with Duhem and Popper in holding
that laws and theory are implicit in the interpretation of observational
and experimental results. What he does not say, however, is that I have
also criticized Popper on just this point.
24 It is important to appreciate
that we always have the option of weakening the theoretical or
metaphysical assumptions implicit in empirical assertions. “This is
copper wire” presupposes that this object has certain dispositional
properties (being a good conductor or electricity, etc.) but does not
necessarily have to assume universal laws to the effect that all pieces of
copper everywhere, at all times, have these properties. In testing laws
and theories it is important that we can weaken theoretical, metaphysical
23 See my Is Science Neurotic?, op. cit., p. 217. I there declare “‘I can walk across a
room’ presupposes that nowhere in the entire universe is an explosion even now
occurring of unprecedented force which will spread with nearly infinite speed to
engulf the room before I can take a step”. I point out that similar considerations
apply to the assertion “This piece of copper wire will continue to behave as copper
wire for the next few minutes”, the kind of assertion all scientific experiments have
to assume to be true.
24 See my “A Critique of Popper’s Views on Scientific Method”, op. cit., pp. 143-
145;and cosmological presuppositions of empirical assertions, so that we do
not presuppose the very law or theory we are seeking to test, or more
than is necessary. Rogers argues that experimentation in physics
presupposes the seven points of what he calls “mechanical realism”.
This strikes me as unacceptability substantial, and indeed close to
physicalism. (I am not sure how physicalism could be false but
mechanical realism true.) A quite basic idea behind aim-oriented
empiricism is that it is important that we have available increasingly
insubstantial presuppositions, so that more substantial ones can be
critically assessed, and not just dogmatically presupposed. This is
important because our more specific presuppositions are quite likely to
be false, and in need of modification. Experimental physics becomes
somewhat irrational and dogmatic if it must presuppose, and cannot
question, mechanical realism.
Rogers is probably correct in holding that much physical theory, such
as nuclear physics, is most severely tested in the laboratory, but it is
important to appreciate that even nuclear physics can be tested by, for
example, astronomical observation. A recent example was the
observation that the sun seemed to be emitting too few neutrinos, which
led some physicists to question whether the relevant physics is correct,
but which was eventually resolved by the discovery that neutrinos have
mass.
25 But even if most physical theory is primarily tested and
corroborated in the laboratory, this does not mean that special
assumptions, such as mechanical realism, are required to apply physical
theory to phenomena beyond the laboratory – in addition, that is, to the
hierarchy of assumptions of aim-oriented empiricism involved in the
rejection of empirically successful, ad hoc variants of the theories we
accept.
Rogers goes on to declare that I “should recognise that different
sciences should have different conceptions of ‘the empirical’ and,
correspondingly, explore different phenomena in accordance with
different conceptions of theory and practice. [I] should
recognise that social sciences have developed distinct methodologies,
often independently of those of the natural sciences, including historical
descriptions and explanations, with their phenomenological,
sociological, and hermeneutic dimensions. Even in the natural sciences
25 Because they have mass, neutrinos, on their way to earth from the sun, oscillate
from one type to another, unobservable type: hence the low observed flow of
neutrinos from the sun.there are differing presuppositions about the nature of ‘the physical’ and
‘the empirical’”. I cannot help but think that I do recognize these things,
and have said them in my publications. Thus, in Is Science Neurotic? I
stress that different branches of the natural sciences have different,
problematic aims, assumptions and methods, and thus diverse characters,
all of which can, however, be encompassed within the broad framework
of aim-oriented empiricism: see pages 41-47. I have long argued that
the social sciences urgently need to be transformed so that they cease to
be, primarily, sciences or disciplines seeking knowledge, and become
instead, with the humanities, that branch of inquiry concerned to help
humanity tackle its problems of living in increasingly cooperatively
rational ways. This would involve, too, as a long-term project, helping
humanity build aim-oriented rationality into our social world, into
institutions other than science. The pursuit of knowledge within social
inquiry would become a secondary matter. All this would involve a
dramatic change in the nature of social inquiry – and a change, too, in
what “experience”, or the “empirical” means, as I have already
mentioned. Social inquiry, instead of being, primarily, science, or the
pursuit of knowledge, would become social methodology, or social
philosophy (although this would, of course, include acquisition of
relevant knowledge and understanding).
In the last paragraph of his essay, Rogers casts doubts on the
possibility of there being a unified conception of inquiry, in view of
“incommensurable standards between different specialisations of natural
or social sciences” and “in the absence of universal agreement on how to
resolve questions of value”. But here, in my view, Rogers seriously
underestimates the capacity of the meta-methodological framework of
aim-oriented rationality and wisdom-inquiry to accommodate, and help
resolve conflicts between, rival views about aims and methods, facts,
values, philosophies of life. The whole idea of aim-oriented rationality
is to create a framework of relatively unspecific, unproblematic aims and
methods within which rival, much more specific, problematic aims and
methods may be assessed and improved, as we act and live. Far from
being “totalitarian”, as Rogers suggests, on the contrary aim-oriented
rationality provides us with the best hope of resolving our conflicts in
just and cooperative ways.
26
26 For discussion of the vital role wisdom-inquiry might have in helping to resolve
conflicts in just and cooperative ways see my From Knowledge to Wisdom, op. cit.,Leemon McHenry
Leemon McHenry, in his interesting and provocative essay, sets out to
assess the relative merits of Popper’s philosophy of science, and mine.
He argues that the difference between Popper’s falsificationism, and my
aim-oriented empiricism is that, whereas Popper holds that metaphysical
assumptions are “held unconsciously” in the minds of scientists, I hold
they form an important part of scientific knowledge. McHenry says that
I am “correct in [my] assessment of the tension in Popper’s late theory,
but this alone does not mean that [Popper] has failed to say what
progress is or means”. McHenry acknowledges that, unlike Popper, I go
on to argue that values play a role in science, and science should
contribute to rational inquiry devoted to promoting wisdom, but then
wonders how these further aspects of my views are related to my
philosophy of science of aim-oriented empiricism (AOE). I take these
points in turn.
I am not altogether happy with the way McHenry draws the
distinction between Popper’s philosophy of science and mine. Much
that he says is correct, but he does not pin down the exact point where
Popper and I part company, and he does not spell out adequately all the
differences that arise as a result, between Popper’s view and mine.
McHenry quotes Popper as holding that “the aim of science [is] to find
satisfactory explanations”. One might think that this makes Popper’s
view rather close to mine, in that I too hold that science seeks
explanatory truth. But there is, here, a fundamental difference.
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Whereas I hold that, if we are honest, we have to see science as seeking
truth presupposed to be (more or less) explanatory, there being a
substantial, highly problematic metaphysical thesis concerning the
1
st ed., pp. 81-91, 109-110 and 189-199; 2
nd ed., pp. 95-104, 121-122, 149-153, and
213-222.
27 It is vital to appreciate that “aims of science” is highly ambiguous. It may refer to
aims in the context of discovery, or to aims in the (so-called) context of justification
– the context in which decisions are reached as to what does, and does not,
constitute scientific knowledge. In what follows it is always “aims in the context of
justification” that is being discussed – although when Popper declares “explanation”
to be the aim of science it is not quite clear which context he has in mind. An
assumption made in the context of discovery is not a part of scientific knowledge,
whereas one made in the context of justification is. The distinction between the two
contexts is usually attributed to Reichenbach, although Popper made the distinction
before him: see my From Knowledge to Wisdom, op. cit., 1
st ed., pp. 22-23; 2
nd ed.,
pp. 33-34comprehensibility of the universe implicit in this basic aim of science,
Popper would reject this entirely. There can be, for Popper, no
metaphysical assumptions, implicit or explicit, in the aims of science.
Right to the end of his life, Popper held onto his “principle of
demarcation” which excludes metaphysics
28 from science.
Popper always held, as I do, that two considerations govern choice of
theory in science, having to do with (1) empirical success or failure, and
(2) simplicity. In chapter VII of The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Popper identifies simplicity with falsifiability. If this identification was
valid then, in persistently accepting simple, or explanatory, theories
scientists would merely be accepting theories of high falsifiability. In
this case, the aim of seeking explanatory truth makes no presuppositions
at all; the aim reduces to that of seeking highly falsifiable truth or truth
per se. But simplicity cannot be identified with falsifiability. One can
easily increase the falsifiability of a theory by adding on independently
testable hypotheses otherwise unrelated to the theory, in this way
drastically decreasing the unity, the simplicity, of the overall theory.
Subsequently, and perhaps because he realized his earlier view is
untenable, Popper made a substantial addition to this account of
simplicity. As McHenry points out, Popper proposed that, in addition to
being highly falsifiable, a “new theory should proceed from some
simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea about some connection or
relation … between hitherto unconnected things or facts … or new
theoretical entities”. As I shall explain in a moment, my view is that, in
only accepting theories that satisfy this “requirement of simplicity” (as
Popper calls it), even though endlessly many rival theories can always be
concocted which satisfy purely empirical considerations much better,
but which fail to satisfy this requirement of simplicity, scientists in effect
make a big, implicit (metaphysical) assumption about the nature of the
universe. But Popper does not draw this conclusion. And nor can he
without destroying his whole philosophy of science, founded as it is on
the principle of demarcation. Thus even after enunciating the new
“principle of simplicity”, Popper continues to hold that science seeks
truth without making any presupposition. Seeking “satisfactory
explanations” does not mean, for Popper, that science presupposes that
explanations exist to be found. Adopting the new “principle of
simplicity” as a methodological principle, and yet denying that this
28 Here, as elsewhere, I follow Popper in taking “metaphysical” to mean
“empirically unfalsifiable”.means science makes some kind of presupposition concerning the
simplicity of nature, is the “tension” that McHenry says I have disclosed
in Popper’s later work.
McHenry declares in the second paragraph of his essay that I hold that
we need to see science as making “a commitment to metaphysical
principles underlying our notion that the universe is comprehensible”.
But this rather puts the cart before the horse. What is crucial, for me, is
the argument, alluded to above, in support of this contention. If physics
only accepts theories that are unified, even though endlessly many
empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted,
then physics must be making a persistent, substantial assumption, at least
to the effect that the universe is such that all disunified theories are false.
Physics must be assuming, implicitly, that there is some kind of
underlying unity in nature.
What McHenry never quite gets round to saying is that it is this
argument
29 which, fundamentally, divides me from Popper. I accept the
argument as valid; Popper never did.
One immediate implication of taking the argument to be valid is that
Popper’s demarcation requirement must be abandoned. Metaphysics is
an integral, central, fundamental part of scientific knowledge. McHenry
is quite clear on this point. What he does not mention, however, is that
there are important further implications, for the philosophy of science,
and for science itself. What emerges differs from Popper in at least the
following sixteen respects.
30
(1) A basic aim of science is transformed, and becomes deeply
problematic. Instead of seeking truth per se, in the so-called “context of
justification”, science seeks truth presupposed to be explanatory. A
metaphysical thesis asserting that the universe is (more or less)
comprehensible, in some way or other, is implicit in this aim. But this
29 The argument was first spelled out by me in 1974 in my “The Rationality of
Scientific Discovery: Part I”, Philosophy of Science 41 (1974) pp. 127-136. It has
been reformulated and amplified many times since: see ref. 30.
30 These 16 features of AOE have been spelled out by me in a number of
publications over the years: see my “The Rationality of Scientific Discovery: Parts I
and II”, Philosophy of Science 41 (1974), pp. 123-153 and 247-295; What’s Wrong
With Science? (Hayes: Bran’s Head Books, 1976); From Knowledge to Wisdom, op.
cit., 1
st ed., chs. 5 and 9; 2
nd ed., chs. 5, 9 and 14; “Induction and Scientific
Realism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, 1993, pp. 61-79, 81-101
and 275-305; The Comprehensibility of the Universe, op. cit.; Is Science Neurotic?,
op. cit. chs. 1 and 2, and appendix.thesis is almost bound to be false. It is vital (for good Popperian
reasons) that the thesis is made explicit within the context of science so
that it can be criticized, so that alternatives can be developed and
assessed, in the hope of improving the thesis. We may hope that this
basic aim, being problematic, will be improved, as science proceeds.
(For Popper, the basic aim is fixed, and does not evolve.)
(2) As the aim, and associated metaphysical assumption, is improved, so
associated methods (specifying non-empirical simplicity and unity
considerations) improve as well. The aims and methods of science
evolve with evolving knowledge. (For Popper, aims and methods are
fixed.
31)
(3) There is a two-way interplay between improving scientific
knowledge, and improving aims and methods. The task of improving
aims and methods becomes an integral part of science itself. (For
Popper, ideas about aims and methods are not falsifiable, and thus not a
part of science. They do not interact and evolve with science.)
(4) Philosophy of science, in so far as it is about aims and methods, is an
integral, influential part of science itself. (For Popper, philosophy of
science, not being falsifiable, is not a part of science.)
(5) Not only do the methods of science evolve over time with evolving
aims, and evolving assumptions implicit in these aims. Furthermore,
according to AOE, different natural sciences, having different specific
aims and assumptions at any given time, quite properly and rationally
have different specific methods, within the overall framework of AOE.
(For Popper, because basic aims are fixed, methods remain unchanged
through time and across scientific disciplines.)
(6) Science, as a result of including metaphysics, aims and methods and
philosophy of science, becomes rather more like natural philosophy, as
in the time of Newton, rather than science today. (Despite
enthusiastically supporting natural philosophy, Popper’s main
31 But is this correct? In his contribution to this volume, Shearmur quotes Popper as
writing, in the Preface to the 2
nd edition of his Conjectures and Refutations, that
“our system of aims not only changes, but it can also grow in a way closely similar
to the way in which our knowledge grows”. I possess only a very battered first
edition of the book. Intrigued, I rushed out to check. Popper is here speaking of
aims in general, not specifically of scientific aims. He could not acknowledge that
the aims of science (in the context of “justification”) change in the way specified by
AOE because that would involve acknowledging that scientific knowledge includes
metaphysical theses, which in turn demands the abandonment of Popper’s
demarcation criterion – something Popper was never prepared to do.contribution, his demarcation requirement, splits off science from
metaphysics, etc., and thus serves to sabotage natural philosophy, and
turn it into science.
32)
(7) As scientific knowledge improves, our knowledge about how to
improve knowledge (our view about aims and methods) improves as
well. There is something like positive feedback between improving
knowledge and improving knowledge about how to improve knowledge
– something which helps to account for the explosive growth in
scientific knowledge. This positive feedback feature may well be
regarded as constituting the nub of scientific rationality. (For Popper,
there is no such positive feedback: scientific rationality is understood in
terms of the Popperian principles of conjecture and refutation.)
(8) Scientific knowledge and discussion takes place at least three levels:
(i) the empirical, (ii) theory and (iii) aims and metaphysical assumptions.
(For Popper, there are only the two levels, (i) and (ii).)
(9) In order to facilitate criticism and improvement of metaphysical
theses, they can be represented in the form of a hierarchy, theses
becoming less and less substantial, and more nearly such as to be
required to be true if science, or the pursuit of knowledge, is to be
possible at all, as one goes up the hierarchy. In this way one creates a
framework of relatively unproblematic aims and methods, assumptions
and methods, not likely to need revision, within which much more
problematic aims and methods, much more substantial assumptions and
methods, can be criticized and improved, as science proceeds. The
methods of science evolve with evolving aims, assumptions, and
knowledge, but what may be termed the meta-methods of science,
associated with higher level, relatively unproblematic and fixed aims and
methods, and required to assess methods, do not change.
33 This
hierarchical structure of AOE is depicted in diagram 2 of chapter 1.
(Nothing like this aim-oriented empiricist picture of science – or natural
philosophy – exists for Popper. This is true even of his conception of
“metaphysical research programmes”.)
(10) There is a (fallible) method of discovery of new theories, even in
physics. This involves modifying existing theoretical and metaphysical
32 For a sustained discussion of this point see my “Popper’s Paradoxical Pursuit of
Natural Philosophy” in J. Shearmur and G. Stokes (eds.) Cambridge Companion to
Popper, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
33 This hierarchical structure of AOE effortlessly solves the problem of reconciling
naturalist and normative conceptions of methodology and epistemology.ideas in order to resolve conflicts between levels indicated in (8). (For
Popper, there is no rational method of discovery.)
(11) AOE implies that there is a great deal of continuity of theory across
scientific revolutions. Metaphysical theses at and above level 4 in the
hierarchy of theses of AOE are likely to persist through revolutions,
even if theories and theses at levels 2 and 3 change quite dramatically.
(Such continuity is even more dependable above level 4.) This all-
important theoretical continuity across revolutions is what makes
rational discovery possible. (For Popper, like Kuhn, there is no basis for
holding that theoretical ideas will persist across revolutions.)
(12) As a result of acknowledging and making explicit the metaphysical
dimension of science there is a very considerable increase in the scope of
scientific knowledge. Conjectural scientific knowledge includes a thesis
about the ultimate nature of the physical universe, namely physicalism at
level 4 of AOE. (For Popper, there is no such thesis in science.)
(13) AOE predicts that physics, if it is making genuine progress, will
advance from one false theory to another – until, perhaps, a theory of
everything is formulated. For AOE includes physicalism at level 4, and
if physicalism is true, all dynamical physical theories about a restricted
range of phenomena only (which cannot immediately be generalized to
apply to all phenomena) are false. That physics has advanced in this
way, from one false theory to another, is thus good news. It is just the
way physics would advance were it to be making progress towards
capturing physicalism in the form of the true theory of everything.
(Nothing comparable holds granted Popper’s philosophy of science, or
standard empiricism more generally. Advancing from one false theory
to another can only be bad news, from the standpoint of scientific
progress. It has led some to speak of “the pessimistic induction”.)
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(14) That physics advances from one false theory to another poses the
problem: In that case, what does scientific progress mean? The problem
34 McHenry asserts at one point that “the truth value of any scientific theory must be
regarded as false”. This represents a characteristic Popperian or standard empiricist
attitude, and is too strong. Granted AOE, it is in physics that we should expect all
dynamical theories to be false (until we formulate a theory of everything).
Elsewhere in natural science mistakes may be made, but this does not mean we
should expect all well corroborated theories to turn out to be false. For example, it
is reasonable to hold that Harvey’s theory concerning the heart is, quite
straightforwardly, true.is readily solved within the framework of AOE.
35 (It is much to
Popper’s credit that he first formulated this “problem of verisimilitude”.
But, as McHenry indicates, Popper’s attempted solution is untenable.
Furthermore, the solution to the problem makes clear that it cannot be
solved if standard empiricism is presupposed. This is because, in order
to solve the problem, one needs to refer to the true theory of everything
– which may, or may not, be unified. This is hardly within the spirit of
standard empiricism.)
(15) The notorious problem of what it is for a physical theory to be
simple or unified has been solved within the framework of AOE.
36
(Popper failed to solve this problem. His attempt at solving the problem
in The Logic of Scientific Discovery fails, for reasons I have already
indicated, and his later, additional “requirement of simplicity” does not
succeed either, as Popper himself acknowledges.)
(16) AOE solves the three parts of the problem of induction – an
enormous success for the view which, so far, has received no comment
whatsoever.
37 (Popper claimed to solve the problem of induction but
failed to solve even the methodological part of the problem – the
problem of specifying methodological rules governing acceptance and
rejection of theories in science.)
McHenry says at one point that Popper has not “failed to say what
progress is or means”. But in order to do this one needs to specify
correctly what the progress-achieving methods of natural science are,
and one needs to solve the problems of verisimilitude, simplicity and
induction. Popper, having failed on all these points, cannot in my view
be held to say – in detail at least – what scientific progress is or means.
McHenry is led to hold there is no difference between Popper and me in
this respect because he ignores most of the differences between our two
views, spelled out in (1) to (16) above.
There is an important additional point about scientific progress which
Popper failed to make, as far as I know. What scientific progress means,
and how successful we judge science to be in achieving it, may well
35 See my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 2
nd edition, op. cit., pp. 393-400 and 430-
433. This improves on an earlier attempt at solving the problem to be found in The
Comprehensibility of the Universe, op. cit., pp. 211-217.
36 See my The Comprehensibility of the Universe, op. cit., chs. 3 and 4; Is Science
Neurotic?, op. cit., pp. 160-174; From Knowledge to Wisdom, 2
nd edition, op. cit.,
pp. 373-386.
37 See ibid, pp. 400-430. See also my The Comprehensibility of the Universe, op.
cit., ch. 5; Is Science Neurotic?, op. cit., appendix, section 6.depend on what we take the aim of science to be. If we take the aim to
be to increase human knowledge, and by “human knowledge” we mean
“knowledge of experts”, there can be little doubt that modern science has
been astonishingly successful. But if “human knowledge” is interpreted
to mean “scientific knowledge and understanding of the 6 billion people
alive today”, modern science must be judged to be very much less
successful, given widespread ignorance of even the overall scientific
picture of the world. If we take the aim of science to be “to help
promote human welfare by scientific and technological means”, the
success of science must be judged to be mixed. Many have benefited
immensely, but many others (the billion or so poor of the planet) have
not. And there are the global problems science has made possible which
serve to undermine human welfare: modern armaments and the lethal
character of modern war; population explosion; destruction of natural
habitats and extinction of species; pollution of land, sea and air; global
warming.
38
A few further remarks, now, about the different attitudes Popper and I
hold towards metaphysics. We both hold some metaphysical ideas to be
of great importance to science in the context of discovery. Popper
denies that metaphysics is a part of scientific knowledge, in the (so-
called) context of justification, whereas I hold that metaphysical theses
asserting the knowability and comprehensibility of the universe are a
central and fundamental component of scientific knowledge. For
Popper, metaphysical ideas are “indispensable for science”, and “give
science its problems, its purposes, and its inspiration”, but nevertheless
are “more of the nature of myths, or of dreams, than of science”.
39
Popper argues that some metaphysical theses – for example the thesis
that nature is uniform – should be turned into methodological rules.
40 I
hold almost the opposite. I argue that corresponding to methodological
rules concerning unity or simplicity there are metaphysical theses which
need to be made explicit within science, so that they can be critically
assessed and improved, this leading to the improvement of the
38 See my “Can Humanity Learn to become Civilized? The Crisis of Science
without Civilization”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2000), pp. 29-44; Is
Science Neurotic?, op. cit., pp. 68-71.
39 K. Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (London: Hutchinson,
1982), p. 165
40 K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959), pp.
252-253.corresponding methodological rules. There is, in Popper, nothing like
the hierarchy of metaphysical theses (and associated meta-
methodological rules) that is such an important feature of AOE,
facilitating, as it does, the critical assessment and improvement of
metaphysical theses, and corresponding methods.
41
The really big differences between Popper’s views and mine arise, not
so much in connection with natural science, as with the nature of social
inquiry and the humanities, and academic inquiry as a whole, matters to
which I now turn.
42
Towards the end of his essay, McHenry asks what relevance AOE has
for science devoted to the promotion of human welfare, or for wisdom-
inquiry – the kind of inquiry I argue for, devoted to seeking and
promoting wisdom. How, he asks, does AOE contribute “to the more
general goal of solving problems of living or the achievement of global
wisdom”? AOE “cannot be just another version of what” I call “the
philosophy of knowledge”.
To take the last point first, AOE might well be a part of knowledge-
inquiry (as I tend to call “the philosophy of knowledge” these days). But
this would miss the full import of AOE.
The basic idea of AOE is that the aim for science of explanatory truth
(truth presupposed to be explanatory) is deeply problematic: physics
must accept some assumption about how the universe is comprehensible,
but this assumption is almost bound to be false. It is vital, therefore, that
science seeks to improve this assumption and associated methods, its
aim and methods, as it proceeds, as an integral part of scientific inquiry.
41 For further details concerning differences between Popper’s and my views
concerning natural science, its methods and philosophy, and the role of
metaphysics, see my “Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism”,
Philosophia 32/1-4, 2005, pp. 181-239; and my “Popper’s Paradoxical Pursuit of
Natural Philosophy”, op. cit.
42 For discussion of these points see my From Knowledge to Wisdom, op. cit., 1
st
ed., pp. 189-198; 2
nd ed., op. cit., pp. 213-220; Is Science Neurotic?, op. cit., pp. 71-
99; “The Enlightenment Programme and Karl Popper”, in . I. Jarvie, K. Milford and
D. Miller (eds.) Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment. Volume 1: Life and Times,
Values in a World of Facts, (London: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 177-90; “The
Enlightenment, Popper and Einstein”, in Y. Shi et al. (eds.) Knowledge and
Wisdom: Advances in Multiple Criteria Decision Making and Human Systems
Management (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007), pp. 131-148.This elementary idea of AOE that science needs to try to improve its
problematic aim and methods as it proceeds can be generalized in three
ways.
(1) It can be generalized to apply to other aspects of science that have
problematic aims.
(2) It can be generalized so as to apply to other branches of academic
inquiry, and indeed to academic inquiry as a whole, in so far as they
have problematic aims.
(3) It can be generalized so as to apply to all worthwhile human
endeavours, personal, social, institutional and global, in so far as they
have problematic aims.
Let me take these points, briefly, in turn.
(1) In my view (as McHenry acknowledges), the aim of seeking
explanatory truth, is a special case of the more general scientific aim of
seeking valuable truth. This latter aim is, if anything, even more
problematic. Of value to whom? In what way? When? The argument
for AOE is that science is more rigorous and objective, and likely to be
more successful, if problematic metaphysical assumptions inherent in
the aim of science are made explicit, so they can be critically assessed
and, we may hope, improved. Essentially the same argument applies to
science taken to seek valuable truth. Science is more rigorous and
objective, and likely to be more successful, if problematic value
assumptions inherent in the aims of science are made explicit, so they
can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved. The aim of
seeking knowledge of valuable truth is, however, a means to such
knowledge being used by people in life, culturally or practically, to
achieve diverse human goals deemed to be of value. There is, in short, a
social, humanitarian or political dimension to science. This is, if
anything, even more problematic. But, as before, science is more
rigorous and objective, and likely to be more successful, if problematic
social or political assumptions inherent in the aims of science are made
explicit, so they can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved.
AOE, I have argued, needs to be generalized, to become “humane
AOE”, and “person-centred science” in turn, in recognition of these
broader, highly problematic scientific aims.
(2) But it is not just science that has problematic aims. Other, non-
scientific branches of inquiry have problematic aims. Indeed, inquiry as
a whole – in so far as it seeks to produce that which is of value to
humanity – has a profoundly problematic aim.(3) Furthermore, many of our individual, social, institutional and global
endeavours have profoundly problematic aims. Almost all our current
global problems – from global warming, population growth, the lethal
character of modern warfare, destruction of natural habitats and rapid
extinction of species, to impending shortage of food, water and oil, and
even the AIDS epidemic (aids being spread by modern methods of
travel) – are consequences of economic and industrial progress made
possible by modern science and technology. They are the unforeseen
consequences of the social goals we have pursued. In personal, social,
institutional and global life we need, whenever aims are problematic (as
they mostly are) to make implicit implications of our aims and actions
explicit, so that we can criticize and try to improve them. AOE needs to
be generalize to become aim-oriented rationality (AOR), potentially
fruitful, and in many cases absolutely vital, whenever our aims our
problematic, whatever we may be doing.
Social inquiry and the humanities, I have argued, ought to take, as a
basic task, to help humanity build into the fabric of social, institutional
and global life the hierarchical structure of AOR, copied from AOE, so
that we may, in life, improve our aims and methods as we live,
somewhat as physicists would do were they to implement AOE
explicitly in doing physics. Social inquiry, on this view, is not primarily
social science, or the pursuit of knowledge. Rather it is social
methodology or social philosophy.
43 What the philosophy of science is
to science, according to AOE, so social inquiry ought to be to the social
world. In particular, on this view, that fragment of social inquiry
concerned with the institutional endeavour of science, namely the
sociology of science, ought to be identical to the philosophy of science.
McHenry asks “Would aim-oriented rationalism put into effect have
altered the course of physics in the twentieth century such that our
current theories would look entirely different and serve humanity in a
way in which they are irrelevant at present?”. There would certainly be
differences for physics,
44 but these would not be such as to make physics
43 This differs dramatically from Popper’s conception of social science as spelled
out, for example, in his The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 1961).
Wisdom-inquiry, again, differs radically from the version of knowledge-inquiry
advocated by Popper.
44 I have argued in some detail that if physicists ceased to pay lip service to standard
empiricism and put AOE explicitly into scientific practice instead, this would have
widespread implications for physics itself: see my The Comprehensibility of the
Universe, op. cit., pp. 23-33 and ch. 7; Is Science Neurotic?, op. cit., ch. 3; “Do Wemore relevant to practical problems of living than it is at present. It is not
the physics of AOE or AOR that has wide import (as McHenry
provocatively suggests) but the methodology. It is adoption of AOR
throughout academia, so that academia may come to help humanity
adopt AOR in personal, social and global life, that is so urgently needed.
If we are to have a future we need to develop the capacity to modify, to
improve, our aims when we see, as we do at present, that we are heading
towards catastrophe. We have known about global warming for a long
time, but have so far been unable to do what needs to be done to avert
the worst possible futures unfolding for humanity. If AOR and wisdom-
inquiry had been put into academic practice 50 years ago, so that
problems of living, and the task of improving problematic aims and
methods in life, had been given the importance that they deserve, we
would now, in my view, be taking effective action to deal with the crisis
of global warming. Bringing about the revolution from knowledge to
wisdom is not just an academic matter: the future of civilization may
depend on it.
From Knowledge to Wisdom
Copthorne Macdonald
In his wonderfully lucid and optimistic essay, Copthorne Macdonald
describes recent initiatives in universities and education that can indeed
be regarded as steps towards the implementation of what I have called
wisdom-inquiry – inquiry rationally devoted to helping people realize
what is of value in life. There are programmes of education and research
devoted to environmental problems, elimination of poverty, conflict
resolution, a more equable relationship between men and women. There
is a flowering, in recent decades, of research into wisdom, and education
devoted to promoting wisdom in schools and universities. Macdonald
concludes that the transformation I have argued for, from knowledge-
inquiry to wisdom-inquiry, is quietly underway, in a multiplicity of
respects, even if we still have some way to go before universities fully
devote themselves to the rational pursuit of wisdom.
With reservations, I am inclined to agree. In the second edition of
From Knowledge to Wisdom I described a number of changes that have
been made in recent years to aspects of science, and of academic inquiry
Need a Scientific Revolution?”, Journal of Biological Physics and Chemistry 8/3,
(2008).more generally which, I said, amount to first steps towards putting
wisdom-inquiry into practice.
45 What is remarkable is that Macdonald
and I refer to the same broad trends – environment, policy, peace
studies, wisdom research and education – and then go on to give
different specific examples of initiatives exemplifying these trends (apart
from a few we both mention).
46 Without doubt, changes are underway
which can be regarded as first steps towards wisdom-inquiry.
Why, then, do I have reservations? Why do I lack Macdonald’s
optimism?
It could be that this is a purely personal matter. Here I have been, for
over 30 years, shouting at the top of my voice “We urgently need to
bring about a revolution in academia so that it comes to help humanity
learn how to create a better world!” and my cries have been ignored.
Even my immediate academic colleagues, my fellow philosophers and
philosophers of science – or rather, especially my immediate colleagues
– have ignored what I have been shouting all these years (apart from
those few who have tirelessly supported my apparently hopeless
campaign). Now I discover that, entirely independently of me, some
aspects of what I have been shouting about all these years are beginning
to be put into practice. But it all seems to be so slow, so piecemeal, and
in some respects, in connection with global warming especially, so late
in the day as to be almost too late. It could be, however, that my sense
of frustration and despair comes simply from hurt vanity: I am
disappointed that my work has turned out to be so little known, so
45 See From Knowledge to Wisdom, 2
nd ed., op. cit., pp. 311-315 and 321-325.
Even in the first edition, I indicated then recent publications that could be regarded
as pointing towards wisdom-inquiry, in the last chapter entitled, optimistically, “The
Revolution is Under Way”. See also M. Iredale, “From knowledge-inquiry to
wisdom-inquiry: is the revolution underway?”, London Review of Education, 5/2,
2007, pp. 117-129, reprinted in R. Barnett and N. Maxwell (eds.) Wisdom in the
University (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 22-33.
46 I think the most important factor that has led scientists and others in recent years
to see that academia needs to change is global warming. There is a growing
appreciation of the need for multi-disciplinary approaches to problems, and for
scientists to interact with government, industry, the media, and the public. I should
add that my own university – University College London – is at present introducing
changes designed to promote contact between disciplines, and enhance research
devoted to helping solve global problems. It is as if the university is now putting
into practice that first step towards wisdom-inquiry I argued for in “Science,
Reason, Knowledge and Wisdom: A Critique of Specialism”, Inquiry 23 (1980), pp.
19-81.ineffective, so unavailable in practice, so unused. It could be that I am
not the right person to make an objective judgement of the significance
of what is going on.
Without denying this as a possibility, let me, nevertheless, attempt an
objective appraisal – one which, it will turn out, is not quite as optimistic
as Macdonald’s.
There are, to begin with, rather obvious developments in academia
that have taken place since 1976 (when I first spelled out the case for the
revolution in What’s Wrong With Science?) which, if anything, amount
to steps away from wisdom-inquiry, or which make it that much more
difficult to put it into practice. In the UK at least, the whole question of
funds has become far more important. In the old days what mattered
was the quality of your research; now what matters is the amount of
money you bring in to your university. The bureaucracy has become
much more powerful and intrusive: instead of serving teaching and
research, it tends now to run the show and make all the important
decisions. Every academic complains bitterly about the amount of time
that goes into administration. Careerism seems even more rampant than
it used to be. The research assessment exercise (discussed by Donald
Gillies in chapter 8) has the effect of repressing slow-developing, really
original and fundamental research, and makes discussion and
implementation of wisdom-inquiry much more difficult. These
institutional changes have all but destroyed the liberal university, based
on the idea that people are employed who are as good as can be at
teaching and research, and then are given as much freedom and
independence as possible, in the hope that what they choose to do will be
worthwhile. Finally, the flourishing of various anti-rationalist doctrines
and movements in universities, satirized and lambasted by Alan Sokal
and others,
47 has all but drowned the idea that the fault with the status
quo might be not an excess of reason, but quite the opposite, not enough.
Both sides in the so-called Science Wars missed the point; and the battle
47 See A. Sokal and J.Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures (London: Profile Books,
1998); A. Sokal, Beyond the Hoax (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); N.
Koertge, ed., A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); P. Gross and N. Levitt (1994) Higher
Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1994); P. Gross, N. Levitt and M. Lewis, eds., (1996)
The Flight from Science and Reason (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1996).served to obscure it. (Some of the positive trends Macdonald describes
have been infected and subverted by these anti-rationalist views.)
These negative developments are important, but are not, perhaps, my
main reason for being pessimistic. My fear is that what I call
knowledge-inquiry is deeply rooted into the institutional structure of
academia, and deeply rooted into the psyches of many academics. It is
at present, in one or other of its forms, the only widely known idea as to
what constitutes rational inquiry. Very powerful forces, having to do
with ambition, careers, prizes, status, ingrained habits of thought and
practice, keep it in place. As long as it continues to be, in academia, the
dominant ideology (as it might be called), it will restrict and frustrate
attempts to develop a more rational and humanly valuable kind of
inquiry, devoted explicitly to helping us create a better world.
Knowledge-inquiry is a multifaceted and quite flexible beast. It does
not restrict what one seeks to acquire knowledge about. Wisdom, peace,
conflict, gender, development, poverty, environmental degradation,
climate change, world health, extinction of species, inequality,
population growth, well being: it readily permits all these to be studied.
Knowledge-inquiry positively encourages and promotes the application
of knowledge to the task of solving social problems. It even permits
policy studies. And of course in academic practice, much goes on at the
fringes, as it were, which violates the edicts of knowledge-inquiry –
which rejects and mocks it. I have in mind anti-rationalist movements
briefly referred to above, movements such as deconstructionism, post-
modernism, social constructivism, and the so-called “strong programme”
in the sociology of science.
The positive developments to which Macdonald refers can all be
regarded as developments within the general framework of knowledge-
inquiry, and not as developments which seriously challenge or threaten
it.
48 That is the reason for my reservations, my pessimism. I am not
sure that the positive developments Macdonald describes really go the
heart of the matter – namely the overthrow of knowledge-inquiry and its
48 This is not quite true of those trends which are explicitly and stridently anti-
rationalist; but these merely provoke a backlash from self-styled “rationalists” who
take knowledge-inquiry for granted, and the net result is that wisdom-inquiry is not
advanced, and it becomes, if anything, even more difficult to get a hearing for the
view. The all-important point that is invariably overlooked by critics of the status
quo (and its supporters of course) is that knowledge-inquiry is defective, not
because it has too much reason, but because it does not have enough.replacement with something more like wisdom-inquiry. My complaint
is not simply that the changes are taking place too slowly, and in too
piecemeal a fashion (although that is a part of it). Rather, my fear is that
all the changes we have seen so far can be accommodated within the
framework of knowledge-inquiry, and thus do not serve to undermine
that framework at all. And as long as the beast of knowledge-inquiry
continues to sit astride our institutions of learning and dominate them,
we will not be able to make the changes that we so urgently need to
make. So much will be permitted; and then we will slam into a brick
wall.
What we urgently need is a kind of academic inquiry which takes its
first priority to be to help humanity come to understand what our
problems of living are – personal, social and global – and what we need
to do about them. Academics need to speak with the public, and not just
with each other. The primary task is public education – education about
what our problems are, and what we need to do (or stop doing) in order
to solve them. This public education must, of course, go in both
directions. Ideas, arguments, experiences, proposals, solutions must
both flow into and out of academia. Public engagement, not instruction,
is what is needed. Academics have, of course, much to learn from non-
academics. We must get away from the idea that you must have a PhD
before you can be permitted to contribute to academic thought. The
thinking that really matters – wisdom-inquiry thought at its most
fundamental and important – is the thinking we do as we live, informing
and guiding our actions. A basic task of academia must be to hoover up
the best ideas, discoveries, solutions, wherever they are to be found in
the social world, and make them available to everyone. Academia has
the task of sifting out and developing the best ideas that there are. And
the central, fundamental task is to come up with ideas as to what we
should do, how we should live. It is to create imaginatively, and assess
critically, policies, political programmes, ways of living, philosophies of
life. These intellectually fundamental tasks are to be undertaken by
social inquiry and the humanities. The less intellectually fundamental
scientific pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how emerges
out of, and feeds back into, thinking about problems of living. On this
view (as I have already said), social inquiry is social philosophy, or
social methodology not, primarily, social science or the pursuit of
knowledge: it seeks to promote imaginative and critical cooperatively
rational resolving of conflicts and problems of living in the world and, asa long-term task, build aim-oriented rationality into the fabric of social
reality.
If we do not discover soon how to resolve our problems and conflicts
in rather more cooperatively rational ways than we have managed to do
so far, we face catastrophe. We are very unlikely to learn how to do this
if our institutions of learning haven’t discovered how to make this their
basic priority. But this requires the wholesale replacement of
knowledge-inquiry by something resembling wisdom-inquiry. The
changes that need to be made to academia, as I have tried to indicate in
the paragraph above, are far more radical, wholesale and structural than
the piecemeal changes Macdonald has described. Changes that take
place within the general framework of knowledge-inquiry are not
enough. Furthermore, piecemeal changes of the kind we have witnessed
so far seem to me not enough to whittle away, even gradually, the
knowledge-inquiry beast.
I cannot help but believe that what is required is a general recognition
of the damaging structural irrationality of knowledge-inquiry, and a
general appreciation of the vital need to create and pursue academia
along the lines of wisdom-inquiry. Above all, there needs to be
recognition of the fundamental importance of improving problematic
aims as we act, as we live.
Our only hope is to tackle our problems democratically. But, if this is
to be done well, it requires electorates to have a good understanding of
what our problems are and what we need to do about them. We cannot
expect democratic governments to be much more enlightened than their
electorates. There is at present a lamentable lack of understanding of
what our problems are and what we need to do about them: one only has
to think of the USA re-electing Bush after the Iraq war, after his
disastrous “war against terrorism”, and after his denial of the realities of
global warming. (The UK does not fare much better, re-electing Blair.)
As I write, it even seems possible that the Republicans will be re-elected
yet again, with a vice President who thinks we are not causing global
warming. It is now a matter of desperate urgency that we transform our
big, public institutions of learning; what we have done so far is in the
right direction, but does not begin to bring about the overall changes that
are needed.
We suffer from a philosophical blunder. Our problem is, in part, that
no one thinks that it is remotely possible that we could be suffering from
a philosophical blunder – a blunder in wholesale aims and methods, inthe philosophy – of inquiry, that is, of how we think. Academic
philosophers have reduced philosophy to just another specialized
discipline alongside others – and an especially sterile one at that. Even
academia is seen as irrelevant, “academic” being another word for
“beside the point”. Rampant specialism within academia has resulted in
a state of affairs where few attempt to take responsibility for the whole
enterprise.
49 There are individuals out there in the world who feel some
responsibility for the state of the world, and where it is going, but all too
few academics who take responsibility for academia as a whole, and for
its responsibility towards the state of the world. We urgently need a new
Enlightenment.
We need a rather general recognition of the following elementary
philosophical points. There are two rival philosophies of inquiry that
need serious consideration: knowledge-inquiry and wisdom-inquiry.
The first dominates science, and academic inquiry more generally, but is
damagingly irrational. The second is vastly superior to the first and, if
implemented, would (other things being equal) result in a kind of inquiry
superior to what we have at present both intellectually and practically. It
would help us make progress towards a good world. The course of our
civilization – even perhaps its very survival – may depend on replacing
knowledge-inquiry with wisdom-inquiry.
I think I should conclude my response to Macdonald’s essay by saying
that, although I have declared myself to be more pessimistic than he is,
nevertheless, as I always used to say to my students, our situation is too
desperate for us to be able to afford the luxury of pessimism.
Steve Fuller
In his delightfully witty and erudite essay, touching on themes from
Kant, Bentham, Aristotle, Francis Bacon, Hegel, Gibbon, Hume, Plato,
Hayek, Kuhn, Freud, Spengler, Edward Said, von Humboldt, Daniel
Dennett and Habermas, Steve Fuller first expresses reservations about
traditional conceptions of wisdom, and then goes on to point out that the
Western tradition has long downgraded or abandoned the very notion.
Fuller contrasts different attitudes to wisdom to be found in the East and
West. Western religions put all the emphasis on prophecy, on
aspirations for the future, on progress; Eastern religions by contrast
emphasize wisdom, learning to endure what will be, restricting
49 See my “Science, Reason, Knowledge and Wisdom: A Critique of Specialism”,
op. cit.expectations to one’s circumstances, and perhaps becoming at one with
reality. Fuller then wonders where I fit in. In some respects I clearly
belong to the Western tradition of progress, but in others I have
something in common, perhaps, with Eastern attitudes.
I must confess, immediately, that what I wish to stress about my work
is not concern for wisdom, but rather the argument that there is an urgent
need to transform the overall aims and methods of academic inquiry.
Having developed the argument, I required a word to stand for the new
aim of the new kind of inquiry my argument had led me to uphold, and
“wisdom” seemed to me the best available. However, when I first
spelled the argument out in print in my first book, What’s Wrong With
Science?, I did not employ “wisdom” at all.
50 Instead, I spoke of a
“people’s rational science of delight and compassion” (taken from the
subtitle), the idea being that delight and compassion speak to the two
aspirations of science at its best, on the one hand intellectual exploration,
the endeavour to see, to know, and to understand for their own sake, and
on the other hand science used to help relieve human suffering. Only
when I came to write From Knowledge to Wisdom did it occur to me that
I might employ “wisdom” to stand for delight and compassion – for the
aim of the new kind of inquiry I was arguing for. In declaring what I
take wisdom to be (on page 66 in the first edition, and on page 79 in the
second edition),
51 I am not so much specifying how I think wisdom
should be defined as indicating how I think the fundamental aim of
rational inquiry should be characterized – an aim that may conveniently
be labelled as “wisdom”. But even this is not quite right, for wisdom,
understood in this way, is merely a means to the end of realizing what is
of value, apprehending, experiencing, sustaining and creating what is of
value, living a life of value. That is what inquiry is ultimately for, in my
view.
I share some of Fuller’s suspicion of traditional ideas about wisdom –
its association with religion, prophets, gurus; its anti-rationalist
connotations; its tendency, in some cases, to act as a smokescreen for the
50 Before that the argument was developed in a manuscript, written in 1972, which
never saw the light of day, called The Aims of Science.
51 This says in part “wisdom being understood here to be the desire, the active
endeavour, and the capacity to discover and achieve what is desirable and of value
in life, both for oneself and others”, and I go on to say that wisdom includes
knowledge and understanding, and can be understood in institutional and social as
well as personal terms.manipulation and exploitation of the gullible and vulnerable. On the
other hand, in declaring the aim of rational inquiry to be to seek and
promote wisdom I cannot altogether dissociate myself from traditional
notions. Instead, I should perhaps confess that I am attempting to
improve both science and traditional ideas about wisdom.
What of the idea that wisdom-inquiry might be a synthesis of West
and East? I do certainly argue that wisdom-inquiry is a synthesis of, and
a great improvement over, traditional Rationalism and Romanticism: see
chapter 1, section 4.
52 But that debate lies wholly within the Western
tradition. Fuller suggests that the difference between West and East is
that, whereas the West seeks to change the environment so that it comes
to satisfy our needs and desires, the East seeks to change the self so that
its needs and desires can be satisfied in the given environment. Given
this characterization of the difference, it is little more than common
sense to hold that we need an appropriate admixture of both. Wisdom-
inquiry, with its emphasis on science and technology, and on tackling
problems of living, all within the framework of improving problematic
aims, clearly provides the means to do justice to both West and East,
when construed in such terms.
53 One may, of course, doubt that this way
of contrasting West and East has much to do with realities, as Fuller
hints when he mentions Edward Said. Modern China does not exactly
seem to embody the spirit of the East, as just characterized.
At one point Fuller remarks that, for me, “the main problem with
science is that it is not consistently put to humanly beneficial ends”.
This is a problem, but not, for me, the main one, which is rather that
natural science suffers from a damaging, irrational, untenable philosophy
of science of standard empiricism. This seriously misrepresents the
highly problematic aims of science, and prevents explicit discussion and
attempted improvement of aims as an integral part of science itself. All
the defects of modern science that I discuss – intellectual, educational,
moral, social, cultural – stem from acceptance and attempted
implementation of standard empiricism.
54 I also argue that natural
52 See my What’s Wrong With Science?, op. cit., pp. 173-196; From Knowledge to
Wisdom, op. cit., chs. 5 and 7; Is Science Neurotic?, op. cit., chs. 3 and 4.
53 I am reminded in this context of Schumacher’s call for “Buddhist economics”:
see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (London: Blond and Briggs, 1973), Part I,
Ch. 4.
54 This theme is to be found in all my books, and a number of my papers. For the
most recent expression of the argument see my “Do We Need a Scientific
Revolution?”, op. cit.science needs to become a part of wisdom-inquiry if it is to develop its
full potential. And I also argue that the real intellectual and moral
disaster in academia lies, not with natural science but with social inquiry
and the humanities. Social science is fundamentally misconceived. It
ought not to be, fundamentally, science or the pursuit of knowledge, in
the first instance, at all. Rather, its proper task is to promote
cooperatively rational tackling of conflicts and problems of living in the
real world.
Fuller remarks that I hold that academia should be “turned into a civil
service dedicated to researching and applying science to solve the
public’s needs”. That is not what I have in mind. What I have argued
for (again and again, I am afraid) is that we need to put problems of
living at the heart of academia, the proper basic task being to articulate,
and try to improve the articulation of, problems of living, and propose
and critically assess possible solutions – possible actions, policies,
political programmes, philosophies of life. On a more long term basis, a
basic task of social inquiry is to help us build aim-oriented rationality
into the fabric of social life. This is very different from “researching and
applying science to solve the public needs”.
Fuller goes on to say that in my view “there is a relatively sharp
division of labour between the public (who supplies the ends) and the
scientists (who supply the means)”. This has no resemblance to what I
have written whatsoever. In my early romantic phase I put the matter, at
one point, like this:-
With humane aim-oriented empiricism and aim-oriented rationalism
before us … it becomes crystal clear that we can no longer conceive
of science as something primarily pursued by experts, owned by
experts, a product of the expert dissociated intellect or mind.
Properly conceived, science is much too central and important a part
of our lives to be thought of, and practiced, in such a way. In
essence, science is our activity, our creation, the outcome of our
concern. It is the outcome of our sharing of our concern for our
world and for each other. It is a part of the expression of, and at the
same the outcome of, our concern to improve our relationships with
the world and each other. The essential things, one might say, are me,
you, and cosmos: science is the adjusting of relationships between
you, me, and cosmos, so that these relationships become less painful,
less frustrating, less restricting, more knowledgeable, moreunderstanding, more appreciative, freer, more sensitive, more honest,
more harmonious, more enjoyable, more trusting and loving.
Obviously experts are important: some technical matters need to be
delegated to experts, who may be permitted to pursue there matters
under our kindly, watchful gaze, and with our help. But the essential
thing is far too important, for too intimately associated with the very
stuff of our lives, and the very stuff of our personal identity, to be left
to experts to decide upon. Science would not be helping us if expert
science deprived us utterly of all free will, and was given a free hand
to determine the very stuff, the very fabric, of our lives. There is no
choice: we must say this: The centre of gravity of science … lies
within our own hearts.
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Many other passages in What’s Wrong With Science? spell out the
theme of science created by and for people, from children onwards, with
some delegation to experts under our watchful, non-expert gaze. The
whole text seeks to move “towards a people’s rational science of delight
and compassion” (the subtitle of the book).
Eight years later, in my more sober, rationalist phase, I put the matter
more soberly, for example in a passage like the following:-
Far from serious, prestigious inquiry being primarily scientific or
academic, it is according to the philosophy of wisdom, if anything, all
the other way round: for each one of us the most important and
fundamental inquiry is the thinking that we personally engage in (on
our own or with others) in seeking to discover what is desirable in the
circumstances of our life, and how it is to be realized.
Institutionalized inquiry is simply a development of our personal and
social thinking, having as its basic task to help us rationally develop
our own personal and social thinking and problem-solving, so we
may all the better realize what is of value to us in our personal and
social lives. Whereas for the philosophy of knowledge the
fundamental kind of rational learning is acquiring knowledge, for the
philosophy of wisdom the fundamental kind of rational learning is
learning how to live, learning how to see, to experience, to participate
in and create what is of value in existence.
56
55 What’s Wrong With Science?, op. cit., p. 67.
56 From Knowledge to Wisdom, op. cit., 1
st ed., p. 66; 2
nd ed., p. 79.Aspects of this theme, again, are further developed in From
Knowledge to Wisdom, and in any number of my other publications.
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Fuller concludes by remarking that my proposal, like others, does not
“pay sufficient attention to the prospect that scientific inquiry may
generate findings that provide grounds for the public to radically re-
orient its aims. (Global climate change is an obvious candidate
example.)”. I am bemused. Not only have I, almost ad nauseam,
stressed the seriousness of the impending crisis of global warming;
central to my work is the theme that our aims in both science and life are
likely to be profoundly problematic, in part because of unintended
consequences of what we do, it being of fundamental importance to
scrutinize our aims, possible unintended consequences of our actions.
Science, of course, can have a vital role in alerting us to the need “to
radically re-orient” our aims. I invariably emphasize that there needs to
be a two-way interaction between science and attempts at solving
problems of living. Equally, our long-standing failure to implement
wisdom-inquiry – which gives intellectual priority to our problems of
living – has much to do with our current inability to respond adequately
to the discovery that if we continue as we are we will plunge into
catastrophe – a point I have made explicitly.
58
John Stewart
57 See, for example, “Science, Reason, Knowledge and Wisdom: A Critique of
Specialism”, op. cit.; Is Science Neurotic?, op. cit., chs. 3 and 4; “Philosophy
Seminars for Five-Year-Olds”, Learning for Democracy, 1/2 (2005), pp. 71-77
[reprinted in Gifted Education International, 22/2-3 (2007), pp. 122-127];
“Popper’s Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy”, op. cit., especially sections 1
and 8. I also emphasize the need for wisdom-inquiry academia to take up, as a
basic task, to educate the public about what our global problems are, and what we
need to do about them – education going in both directions in the form of
arguments, ideas, information, experiences: see for example “Can Humanity Learn
to become Civilized? The Crisis of Science without Civilization”, op. cit.: “The
Disastrous War against Terrorism: Violence versus Enlightenment”, in A. W.
Merkidze (ed.) Terrorism Issues (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007).
58 See my “Are Philosophers Responsible for Global Warming?”, Philosophy Now,
issue 65, (January/ February 2008), pp. 12-13.After giving a lucid summary of my argument,
59 John Stewart goes on
to ask “why is it so hard to move from knowledge to wisdom?”. It is
hard, in part because of vested interests, in part because pursuing
wisdom is a social matter. It cannot be done by an individual alone.
Stewart then considers what opposes wisdom-inquiry in the world, and
takes us on a fascinating journey which includes: an account of Etienne
de la Boétie’s Discourse on Voluntary Servitude published 1553 (of
which I had never heard): Max Weber’s views on capitalism and its links
with Calvinism; the way capitalism compels the business world to
narrow its aims to nothing more than a demented pursuit of profit; Karl
Marx’s view that competition drives profit down, which in turn leads to
an almost lunatic striving for innovation in an attempt to boost profits; J.
Schumpeter’s account of social havoc produced by such capitalist
innovation; the Club of Rome’s thesis that unrestrained economic
development must lead to ecological disaster – a disaster that now stares
us in the face in the form of global warming and other impending
environmental crises. What opposes wisdom-inquiry in the world is the
capitalist system, with its reckless, blind pursuit of profit – just that
which threatens us with impending disaster. What we need to change is
what prevents change. Stewart concludes by alluding to the possibility
of the complete collapse of all our social institutions, but hopes we
might find the means to avoid this disaster.
I agree with Stewart’s assessment of the gravity of our situation. On
the day I write these words in the autumn of 2008, it was announced on
the BBC news that, despite all the efforts to reduce CO2 emissions,
global CO2 emissions are increasing at a rate that is four times the rate in
1990.
As Stewart clearly realizes (even though he does not make the point
explicitly), those who back wisdom-inquiry face three tasks:
(1) Getting a hearing for the argument that we urgently need to
transform our institutions of learning so that they put wisdom-inquiry
into practice.
59 One minor caveat. Stewart asserts at one point: “It is therefore an elementary
requisite for rationality to give overriding priority to correctly identifying the aims
to be achieved”. I tend to emphasize the importance, for rationality, of trying to
improve our aims as we proceed (it being quite likely we will fail to identify what is
best in a problematic aim at our first attempt). It is certainly a mistake to hold that,
for rationality, we must first identify our aim correctly before we proceed (not,
incidentally, quite what Stewart asserts).(2) Transforming academia so that it puts wisdom-inquiry into practice.
(3) Transforming our social world so that it puts aim-oriented rationality
(the methodological key to wisdom-inquiry) into practice.
What really matters is (3). (2) is important to help bring (3) about,
and (1) is important to help bring (2) about.
I have devoted over 30 years of my working life to step (1) – so far,
without much success. I used to think that (1) was a necessary first step
to bringing (2) about, and (2) a necessary first step to bringing (3) about.
Now I am not so sure. Despite my reservations, I agree with Copthorne
Macdonald that changes are underway in academia which can be
regarded as piecemeal steps towards wisdom-inquiry (without any
awareness of my work): see above and chapter 3. And the dire threat of
catastrophic runaway climate change is now prompting many to do what
they can to contribute to a reduction in energy consumption and an
increase in energy production by renewable methods (which do not in
turn do more harm than good) – at the same time doing what they can to
spread awareness of the urgent need to do these things. Many people are
battling away, in different contexts and in different ways, to bring about
changes, in the social world, and in academia, which can be regarded as
steps towards (3) and (2).
However, even if (1) is not necessary for (2), and (2) for (3), it is
undoubtedly the case that (1) would help with (2), and (2) would help
with (3).
Is Stewart correct in holding that the key factor which blocks steps
(1), (2) and (3) is the capitalist system and the demented, destructive
drive towards profit? Undoubtedly, it is a factor. As I write these
words, in the autumn of 2008, the world’s financial system is in crisis –
a crisis brought about by banks pursuing profit in an insane fashion, with
no thought for the future. Blinkered pursuit of profit is clearly a part of
the problem.
But is it the key factor, the only factor? My answer is “No”.
To begin with, different factors block steps (1), (2) and (3). It has not
been capitalism which has blocked (1), but rather, as Stewart and I
agree, vested interests and ingrained habits of thought of senior
academics, the deplorable state of academic philosophy, social
constructivism and anti rationalism among historians and sociologists ofscience, and the distraction of the Science Wars.
60 There is also what I
have called “the lobster pot effect” of standard empiricism and
knowledge-inquiry: once these doctrines are accepted and
institutionalised, they shield themselves from effective criticism. Thus
standard empiricism demands of a potential contribution to science that,
in order to enter the intellectual domain of science, it must be
empirically testable. The demonstration that standard empiricism is
untenable fails to satisfy this requirement, and is thus excluded from
science. In a similar way, the argument that knowledge-inquiry is
irrational is not exactly a contribution to knowledge, and so is excluded,
by knowledge-inquiry, from the intellectual domain of academic inquiry.
In addition, in order to publish in scientific or academic journals, you are
obliged to cast your paper in a form which conforms to the edicts of
these doctrines (even if, privately, you reject them). Thus what is
published seems to bear out the truth of the doctrines; this serves to
convince students and fledgling academics of the truth of the doctrines,
and makes it seem all the more absurd to question their validity. In line
with all this, I have found it extraordinarily difficult, over the years, to
get my work published in academic journals, let alone in scientific
journals – although, before I stumbled across this “knowledge to
wisdom” argument, I had no difficulty whatsoever. I admit there may be
other reasons for difficulty in getting my work published. I also
acknowledge that it may be easier these days to publish an article in a
scientific journal calling current aims and methods of science into
question than it was ten or twenty years ago.
These are some of the factors which have blocked step (1), none of
which have much to do with capitalism. When it comes to step (2),
much depends on the battle for step (1) having been won. But it has not
been, which provides sufficient grounds for the failure so far to win the
battle for (2) as well. But if step (1) had been achieved, I am quite sure
that there would still be resistance to (2) in scientific and scholarly
quarters, for the sorts of reasons I have indicated, and for reasons
famously discussed by Kuhn.
61 If the academic community began to be
serious in seeking to implement wisdom-inquiry, opposition might well
60 This has led rationalists into combating anti-rationalists, and has distracted them
from considering the damaging structural irrationality of what they take for granted,
standard empiricism and knowledge-inquiry.
61 T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962), ch. XII.come, even in liberal democracies, from government, industry, the
military, the media, and the public. The capitalist system might play a
role in opposing a switch in funding of scientific and technological
research away from the needs of domestic industry and towards the
needs of the world’s poor. But this would be just one factor amongst
others.
What of step (3), the one that really matters? We need to distinguish
two very different questions. Is the capitalist drive towards profit
primarily what needs to be changed? Is it this which primarily prevents
aim-oriented rationality from being implemented in the social world?
The capitalist pursuit of profit would be a factor in preventing the
implementation of aim-oriented rationalism in the social world –
supposing steps (1) and (2) had already been achieved – but not the only
one. There are other institutions and aspects of life resistant to
imaginative and critical exploration of problematic aims as well:
government, the military, religion, the law, public opinion. Those who
possess inordinate wealth, power or status are likely to resist serious
scrutiny of aims of relevant institutions and social endeavours. Quite
generally, whenever aims are seriously problematic, there is a tendency
to misrepresent aims, and a reluctance to reconsider and scrutinize aims
officially acknowledged.
I am inclined to think that there is an even deeper reason for our
ineptitude when it comes to acknowledging, critically examining and
revising problematic aims. This has its roots in our evolutionary past.
At the end of chapter 1, in section 6, I indicated five reasons why our
evolutionary past may well make it especially difficult for us to put aim-
oriented rationality into practice in personal and social life – it being, as
a result, all the more important that we strive to do just that.
Even if capitalism is not exclusively – or even primarily – what
prevents change, it might still be what primarily needs to be changed. Is
this the case?
I am in favour of speaking of “the free market system” rather than
capitalism, to emphasize both that there is something good about the
system, and that greedy capitalists are not alone responsible for what is
bad about it. What is good about the system is that it is responsive to the
needs and desires of people. This in turn ensures that consumers share
responsibility for what is bad about the market system along with greedy
capitalists – and with incompetent governments, one might add. There
is an additional point to speaking of the free market rather thancapitalism: it is a broader concept. A system that required all firms to be
cooperatives, shares being owned only by those who worked for the firm
in question, could be a free market, but would not, presumably,
constitute capitalism.
The responsiveness of the free market to the needs and desires of
people has its limitations, of course: advertising can create artificial
markets; those with minority interests, and the poor may find it difficult
to get the market to respond to their needs. The market only responds to
need if backed up by sufficient wealth – and if wealth is unjustly
distributed, the marked will be unjust as well. The desires of many have
more impact on the market than what is genuinely of value, desired by
few (unless the few are especially wealthy, of course): desires, however
mundane, take precedence over what is genuinely of value. The market,
responding to demand, may develop in ways which are, in some
respects, undesirable for many – as when supermarkets cause small
shops to close. If the market is to operate in ways which are, as far as
possible, genuinely beneficial to all of us, it needs to be restricted in
scope, encouraged and controlled by appropriate regulations, and
developed in desirable directions by the purchases of enlightened
consumers. All this in turn, in my view, requires a kind of academia that
puts wisdom-inquiry into practice.
Is it the free market system, as it exists and operates at present, that
needs primarily to be changed in order to develop a wiser world? An
overwhelming need at present is to reduce dramatically and rapidly
emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Modern methods of
energy production, industry, travel and agriculture, conjoined to
explosive population growth are what have led us to the present
impending crisis. It does not make any difference whether these modern
methods of energy production, industry, etc., develop in a world
dominated by capitalism or communism: if CO2 is emitted at the same
rate, global warming will proceed at the same rate. Nature knows
nothing of political or economic systems. The old Soviet Union was
even worse at polluting the environment than the capitalist “West”. If
the world was dominated by communism we would be today in an even
worse predicament, in part because it would be even more difficult, in
such a world, to get a hearing for the unwelcome news of global
warming.
Can CO2 emissions be reduced rapidly without the destruction of the
capitalist system, as it exists and operates at present? Consumers,governments and scientists could conspire to make offers to the capitalist
system which it could not refuse. A combination of legislation,
incentives, penalties, and consumer choices could redirect energy
production and use, industry, travel and agriculture so that CO2
emissions are rapidly reduced. In my view, this would require the
redirection but not the destruction of capitalism.
62 And even if it did, we
should still direct our attention towards what needs to be done: reduction
of CO2 emission. Turning our attention away to the attempted
destruction of capitalism would be a strategic disaster.
Leaving global warming on one side, is capitalism what primarily
needs to be changed to create a wiser world? It is a part of the problem.
In From Knowledge to Wisdom I argued for a cooperative free market
system. But it is only a part of our current clutch of global problems.
There is our current tendency to resort to war, and the lethal character of
modern war. There is the stockpiling of armaments. There are the
countries lacking democracy, civil rights, free media. There is the rapid
increase in world population, and pollution of land, sea and air.
Capitalism is not required to generate these problems. Pollution in the
Soviet block was as bad as, if not worse than, anything produced in the
capitalist “West”. And the Soviet Union was not exactly renowned for
democracy, civil rights and free media. Pursuing an aim energetically
and enthusiastically which one, at the same time, doubts and subjects to
sustained criticism – which is what is required for aim-oriented
rationalistic action – is inherently difficult, at both personal and
institutional levels. We do not need to invoke capitalist greed to explain
why it is so hard to put aim-oriented rationality into practice in our
personal and social lives.
Joseph Agassi
Joseph Agassi sets out to explore the fundamental problem: How
ought we to set agendas, for scientific research, for philosophy, for
academic inquiry more generally, and for the public arena, for politics?
During the course of his exploration, Agassi takes us on a whirlwind
tour of such matters as: the impact of the Enlightenment and
Romanticism, Arne Naess, Russell and Popper, the idea that knowledge
is morally neutral, Popper’s battle against inductivism, the question of
62 I am inclined to think that the view that the free market system should be
abolished, and the view it should be entirely unregulated, are two sides of the same
coin. Everything of interest lies between these two extremeswhether we should attempt to engage irrationalists in rational debate,
Kant and Kuhn, the failure of philosophers to discuss the problem of
agenda setting apart from Francis Bacon and Polanyi who, however,
have nothing useful to say. Boyle, Whewell, Schrödinger, Born, Peirce,
Carnap and Wittgenstein are, amongst others, briefly visited during our
whirlwind tour. Agassi tellingly remarks that the problem of agendas is
judged by philosophers not to be on the agenda. In politics, Agassi
declares, he who sets the agenda holds power. Tyrannies can create a
semblance of democracy by determining the agenda of parliaments.
Democracies set out to improve conditions by critical discussion and
legislation, but there is a general preference for muddling through rather
than adopting radical solutions.
Agassi concludes by pointing out that our situation is fraught with
peril. Pollution, population growth, CO2 emissions, nuclear war all
threaten humanity. We urgently need a new radical global plan to tackle
our global problems, but politics concerns itself only with local matters
of party and nation, and philosophers discuss these matters not at all.
Science cannot be relied upon for, as Churchill once remarked: “the
Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science”. Global
survival ought to be on all our agendas.
Agassi fails to solve the problem he has raised concerning agendas, as
he himself admits. What is odd is that he seems not to have noticed that
my own work amounts to a proposal as to how to solve at least the
methodological part of the problem.
63 Standard empiricism (SE) –
including Popper’s version – leaves the whole issue of choice of
research aims or agendas beyond the domain of the scientific.
64 But SE
is untenable. The widespread attempt to put SE into scientific practice
damages science, in part precisely because it does place aims or agendas
beyond science. SE is untenable because, in physics (the fundamental
natural science) theories are selected on the basis of compatibility with
(1) evidence, and (2) the best available metaphysical conjecture as to
63 I am puzzled too by Agassi’s suggestion that I hold that our most urgent global
problem is the pressure of migration from poor countries to rich ones. I do not hold
this, and have never said that I do.
64 It so happens that Agassi declares questions concerning agendas to be “inherently
unscientific”. This suggests to me that he upholds some version of SE. As I
explain in the text, once it is recognized that SE is untenable, it becomes clear that
the rationality of science requires that questions concerning scientific aims or
agendas be included within the rational, scientific domain. Just this would be done
by AOE science – or science pursued within the context of wisdom-inquiry.how the universe is physically comprehensible. The rationality of
science requires that its metaphysical assumptions be rationally chosen,
and aim-oriented empiricism (AOE) provides a meta-methodology for
doing just that. AOE specifies how the agenda of theoretical physics can
be progressively improved as science proceeds. And I go on to argue
that, having acknowledged that science has the problematic aim of
seeking explanatory truth, we need to take into account that science,
more generally, seeks valuable truth, and seeks to make this available
for the use and enrichment of humanity – these further scientific aims
involving values and politics, if anything even more inherently
problematic than metaphysics, and thus requiring sustained imaginative
and critical discussion, as an integral part of science itself. But in order
to accommodate this vital dimension of agenda discussion and
improvement, the institutions of science need to be changed – especially
as value and political aspects of scientific aims need the involvement of
the public. We urgently need, in short, a new kind of science which
acknowledges the need for sustained discussion at three levels: (1)
empirical (2) theoretical and (3) aims or agendas.
All this, I go on to argue, has a profound significance for the rest of
academia, and for the rest of life – especially our political life and our
efforts to come to grips with our menacing global problems. Treading a
path parallel to Popper, I have generalized AOE to form aim-oriented
rationality (AOR), designed especially to help us improve problematic
aims as we proceed, as we live. AOR is especially relevant when it
comes to tackling our immense global problems – when it comes to
attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. But a
world that puts AOR into practice is hardly conceivable without
wisdom-inquiry being put into practice in our universities and schools
instead of what we by and large have at present, knowledge-inquiry. As
a first step, we urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia.
Not a whisper of this argument is to be found in Agassi’s contribution.
He does say that I am “one of the few who have raised the alarm”, but
seems not to have noticed that I have had something to say about how
we should deal with what is so alarming – how we should set about
tackling our immense, intractable, threatening global problems.
Margaret Boden
In her outstanding contribution, packed with fascinating information
about the birth and early development of cognitive science, MargaretBoden argues that cognitive science could not have developed without
computers, and computers would not have been developed without the
military. In short, “Cognitive science as we know it today simply
couldn't have existed without the military.” Good science may have to
depend on bad sources for funding. There are, Boden concludes, no easy
answers.
Boden appreciates that her argument does not tell against wisdom-
inquiry (or, more specifically, humane aim-oriented empiricism as I have
called the doctrine that holds that a proper basic intellectual aim of
science is to seek knowledge of valuable truth and make it available to
humanity to help enrich human life
65). Central to my whole argument is
the point that the real aims of science are profoundly problematic.
Boden’s claim concerning military funding of science reinforces this
point. Nevertheless, Boden does raise awkward questions for wisdom-
inquiry – and for anyone who supports the whole idea of science being
for humanity.
But before I discuss her main argument in more detail, I must first try
to clear up what seems to me to be a rather serious misunderstanding of
my work. Towards the end of her contribution, Boden says that in
“insisting that social enquiry must precede science” I hold “not merely
that social concerns should guide science's research agenda” but “also
that the philosophy of the conscious human subject/society must underlie
the epistemology of science itself” which, Boden remarks, comes
“perilously close” to the irrationalism of Heidegger, Roszak, the strong
programme, and views of Harré and Bruner.
I am horrified that I should have been so misunderstood. What I argue
for is diametrically opposed to irrationalism, social constructivism and
anti-realism.
66 As I have repeatedly said, my concern is to strengthen the
objectivity, rationality and realism of science, not undermine these
things.
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In arguing for wisdom-inquiry I do, it is true, argue that problems of
living, of action, are intellectually more fundamental than problems of
65 See my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1
st ed., pp. 95 and 100-110; 2
nd ed.,
pp. 108 and 113-122.
66 Furthermore, I have repeatedly argued against irrationalism, anti-realism, social
constructivism and the strong programme: see for example, my work on quantum
theory (note 3 of chapter one), my “Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein
versus van Fraassen”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, 1993, pp.
61-79, 81-101 and 275-305, and my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 2
nd ed., pp. 7-9.
67 See, for example, my From Knowledge to Wisdom, op. cit., chs. 3-5.knowledge, social inquiry is more fundamental than natural science, and
action is, in a certain sense, more fundamental than knowledge (in that
written statements of knowledge become mere marks on paper if not
related to and understood by conscious beings acting in the world). I
also argue that what I have called “person-to-person understanding”
68 is,
in a certain sense, more fundamental than scientific understanding, in
that the latter presupposes the former (although I also remark that “the
two kinds of understanding dovetail together, being interdependent”
69).
70
But far from any of this coming “perilously close” to irrationality, quite
to the contrary, science pursued in accordance with aim-oriented
empiricism (AOE), and wisdom-inquiry is, I argue, both more rigorous
and likely to be of greater human value than science shaped by standard
empiricism (SE), as at present. Whereas SE misrepresents the aims of
science, and thus stifles scrutiny of problematic assumptions concerning
metaphysics, values and politics inherent in these aims, AOE provides a
meta-methodological framework for the scrutiny and improvement of
these assumptions and aims. It is this which makes AOE science both
more rigorous and likely to be of greater human value than science
shaped by SE.
71
Social inquiry is, for me, more fundamental than natural science given
the aim of promoting human welfare (or seeking wisdom), but it is very
definitely not more fundamental given the aim of improving scientific
knowledge and understanding of the world. AOE science does not
merely seek objective factual truth, and accept scientific realism; it goes
very much further in that, according to AOE, physicalism is a relatively
secure part of scientific knowledge.
68 Person-to-person understanding is my version of what is sometimes called
“empathic understanding”, “folk psychology” or “theory of mind”: see my From
Knowledge to Wisdom, op. cit., 1
st ed., pp. 183-189, 2
nd ed., pp. 206-213. See also
my The Human World in the Physical Universe, op. cit., pp. 13-14 and 103-112.,
where I employ the term “personalistic” understanding.
69 And I continue “Only the philosophy of wisdom can do justice to both kinds of
understanding, and their interdependence, in a unifying way, both being essential to
wisdom”: see my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1st ed., p. 189, 2
nd ed., pp. 212-213.
70 For arguments for these points see my From Knowledge to Wisdom, chs. 4, 5, 8
and 10; The Human World in the Physical Universe, op. cit., chs. 2, 5, 6 and 9.
71 See my From Knowledge to Wisdom, chs. 5 and 9; 2
nd ed., ch. 15; The
Comprehensibility of the Universe, op. cit.; Is Science Neurotic?; “Do We Need a
Scientific Revolution?”, op. cit.Person-to-person understanding has a fundamental role within
wisdom-inquiry, and cannot, in my view, be reduced to, or fully
explicated in terms of, scientific understanding. In fact scientific
understanding is itself, I argue, an aspect of person-to-person
understanding with everything personal removed.
72 In seeking to acquire
person-to-person understanding of another, I may be interested in the
person, or I may be interested in the world, and I seek to know what the
other believes about the world because I think this may contribute to my
knowledge of it. Public scientific knowledge emerges from this aspect
of person-to-person understanding. (And construing science in this way
can aid the rigour and objectivity of science because, as a result of re-
introducing the personal dimension, personal aims and motivations, into
science, it becomes possible to critically assess, and possibly improve,
these aims and motivations.)
The crucial point to appreciate is that, in construing scientific
knowledge as an aspect of, a development of, person-to-person
understanding, we do not in any way undermine the fact-seeking
character of science, its objectivity or rigour (just the opposite, in fact).
Quite generally, in order to acquire good, authentic person-to-person
understanding of another I need to know, not just how that person sees
his world, but what relevant aspects of the world are really like. Person-
to-person understanding (as understood by me) thus presupposes and
requires factual knowledge of the world, a concern for factual truth,
objectivity, realism (ultimately, scientific realism). The two kinds of
understanding, person-to-person and scientific, dovetail together, as I
have said, in that they presuppose each other.
Finally, in holding that person-to-person understanding cannot be
reduced to scientific understanding, I am not maintaining that it can
replace cognitive science, AI or neuroscience (which is perhaps what
Boden fears). My actual view is that these sciences are enriching, and
will continue to enrich, person-to-person understanding, but will not
replace this latter kind of understanding. Person-to-person
understanding is not folk psychology, as conceived by Paul Churchland,
to be replaced eventually by scientific psychology, just as folk physics is
replaced by scientific physics.
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72 See my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1
st ed., pp. 188-189, 2
nd ed., pp. 211-213;
The Human World in the Physical Universe, op. cit., pp. 108-111.
73 See Ibid, p. 135, notes 31 and 32.With that misunderstanding I hope cleared up, I return to considering
Boden’s main argument.
Is Boden right in holding that computers only exist today because they
were developed by the military, and without “computers, no cognitive
science”? I have my doubts about both claims. It is notoriously difficult
to establish the truth of such counterfactual theses as these. Boden
herself points out that many of those who played a crucial role in
developing computers, and computer models of the brain – Turing, von
Neumann, Bush and others – did so initially independently of the
military. It was because of the second world war that they were dragged
into doing war work. This must have played an important role in
inducing the military to fund work developing computers. Quite
generally, the war – and above all the outcome of the Manhattan project
– played a crucial role in inducing the military to spend vast sums on
scientific research (especially, of course, research in physics), as Daniel
Greenberg has convincingly argued.
74 Suppose the second world war
never happened. Hitler was assassinated before he attained power,
Germany did not invade Czechoslovakia or Poland, and Japan, without
Germany as an Ally, did not go to war with the USA. The founding
fathers of the computer in the 1930s and 1940s successfully argued for
the fundamental importance of the computer, for research and for civil
society. Computers were developed without military funding.
Boden may object that this counterfactual story misses the point of her
argument. Given that the war did happen, could those responsible for
developing the computer have eschewed all involvement with the
military after the war, and still found funds (from non-military sources)
sufficient to create the modern computer? (Turing did, in fact, work on
developing the computer, not very successfully,
75 at the National
Laboratory in Teddington, UK.) The development of computers might
have been delayed, but I think it would be very difficult to establish that
we could not have something like the modern computer today by such a
research route.
74 D. S. Greenberg, The Politics of American Science (Harmondsworth: Pelican
Books, 1969).
75 Turing was not good at presenting the case for the importance of his work to his
superiors, and his approach to creating a workable computer was flawed: see A.
Hodge, Alan Turing (London: Burnett Books, 1983).
6 D. S. Greenberg, op. cit..Boden is of course correct in arguing that computers were massively
influential in the development of cognitive science, both in being a
source of theoretical ideas for the science, and in providing the means to
test artificial intelligence models. What she does not consider, however,
is a point I made long ago, in 1985: computers may also have played a
role in retarding progress in the fields Boden is concerned with:
cognitive science, AI, psychology, neuroscience.
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These fields are all concerned to understand the human brain/mind.
This is a profoundly intractable problem. It is vital to get as good a basic
formulation of the problem as possible, and then choose the best possible
preliminary or subordinate problems to tackle in an attempt to work
progressively towards the basic problem one seeks to solve – the best
possible research route, in others words, to the ultimate goal of
understanding how the brain works. The fields Boden is concerned with
failed in both of these elementary tasks, in the 1950s to 1970s, in part
because of the all-pervasive influence of the idea that one could take the
computer, with its distinction between hardware and software, as a good
model for the brain and mind.
77
In my 1985 paper I argued that, in order to get clear about how to
formulate the basic problem properly, it is important to put things into
the context of biology and evolution, and ask “what is the function of the
brain?” as one might ask “what is the function of the heart or lungs?”.
Put in that way, the answer is obvious: the function of the brain is so to
guide or control the actions of the animal that, in its given environment,
it does what it needs to do to survive and reproduce. Evolution designs
brains to be good at this. The fundamental problem, then, is to
understand how brains control animals to act so as to be conducive to
survival and reproductive success. At the most basic level, the problem
of understanding how the brain works is the problem of understanding
how the brain controls action. It is not primarily a problem of
computation or of intelligence, but of control. At the very outset, this
point was appreciated quite well, for example by those who, like Wiener,
spoke up on behalf of the cybernetic model of the brain, but it got
76 See my “Methodological problems of neuroscience” in D. Rose and V.G.
Dobson, eds., Models of the Visual Cortex (Chichester: John Wiley,1985) pp. 11-21.
77 Margaret Boden, whose knowledge of the history of cognitive science and AI is
vastly more extensive than mine, disagrees with my historical remarks about the
field. For her account see M. Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive
Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2006).somewhat lost sight of as the computer model became increasingly
influential in cognitive science and AI.
In my 1985 paper I argued that, if one takes control as fundamental, it
is at once clear that what is required is an understanding of what may be
called hierarchical control. At the top of the hierarchy there are (brain)
processes determining the overall action: hunting, escaping from
predator, caring for offspring. This high level control system controls,
we may presume, a large number of lower level control systems which
control specific actions (running, leaping, freezing), each of which in
turn controls many lower level control systems controlling individual
limbs, and ultimately individual muscles – the contraction of individual
muscles being coordinated so at to produce the actions required or
specified by the high level control system. It did not seem to me that AI
and related fields in the 1960s and 1970s made any attempt at all to
develop hierarchical control architecture of the type I have just indicated.
This obvious idea did not seem to exist.
78 And the reason for this failure
even to see what is needed seemed to me to come from the all-pervasive
influence of the computer model of the brain. My knowledge of desktop
computers is extremely limited, but my conjecture is that their
architecture did not then, and probably still does not, resemble the
hierarchical model I have indicated in the least.
I remember well that at some point in the 1970s, the arrival of the idea
of parallel processing provoked great excitement. This rather confirms
my hypothesis that the hierarchical model was not common currency at
the time. If it had been, then parallel processing would not have been
treated as a novel idea, for of course such processing is a part of
hierarchical control, but only a part.
Not only did AI and related fields fail to formulate the basic problem
properly (because, I suspect, of the influence of the computer model of
the brain); they failed also to tackle the proper preliminary problems, i.e.
choose the proper research route. AI, during the 1960s and 1970s sought
to develop programmes which imitated fragments of “intelligent” human
behaviour, such as playing chess, recognizing objects or speaking a
language. The implicit idea, in other words, was that solutions to these
78 But I may be overstating things here. Margaret Boden tells me that in the 1970s a
few AI researchers were writing about, but not developing, the kind of hierarchical
control systems I have indicated. Nevertheless, it still seems to me that much work
in AI at the time did make the mistake I have attributed to it. I do not need to claim
that all AI work funded by the military rested on an intellectual mistake.preliminary problems could eventually be put together to solve the
fundamental problem – an approach that eventually led to a kind of crisis
in the field. But such an approach, based again on the computer model
is, I argued in my 1985 paper, misconceived from the outset. Putting the
problem into the context of biology and evolution would have made it
abundantly clear that the proper research route is to follow the path of
evolution, and begin by developing artificial brains which mimic the
actions, the way of life, of living things with the simplest nervous
systems – for example, the neural net of the sea anemone, and then work
up gradually to nervous systems of increasing complexity and
sophistication. Eventually this did become the approach adopted by AL
– “artificial life”.
Finally, the computer model misled workers in the field into thinking
one could make a straightforward distinction between hardware and
software when it comes to biological brains. This, I argued in my 1985
paper, is a grave mistake (and still seems to me to be a mistake). The
distinction makes sense in connection with computers. Computers are
designed quite specifically to run different programmes, and thus
perform different functions. But brains are not designed like that at all.
The proper way to think about the brain, I repeat, is that it is a
hierarchical control system, and not anything like a computer at all.
If these points are correct, there are grounds for holding that the
availability of funds from the military for the development of computers,
and cognitive science linked to computers, served to corrupt research
into understanding the human brain and mind. One could regard this as a
specific example of a much broader kind of corruption that overtook
natural science (especially physics) as a result of funds being poured into
the field by the military after the second world war. Such is the message
of Daniel Greenberg’s brilliant and important The Politics of Pure
Science.
79 Scientists squandered funds on expensive research projects
which had poor prospects of yielding significant results. Deceiving grant
giving bodies about the aims and likely outcome of research projects
became standard. Scientists lost a certain independence from
government. The availability of funds for expensive, big science
research projects may have distracted scientists from formulating and
tackling fundamental problems of understanding.
80 There may be, too, a
79 D. S. Greenberg, op. cit.
80 Vast sums were spent on building ever bigger particle accelerators, ostensibly to
explore the fundamental nature of the physical universe, and yet basic flaws in thegradual corrupting influence over priorities of research in that they came
to correspond increasingly to the interests of the military. Furthermore,
the military may fund science so that students can be trained to work, as
graduates, in military research establishments.
Accepting funding from the military can, in short, damage science.
Furthermore, in so far as it leads to deception when it comes to grant
applications for research, it takes science further away from engaging in
sustained honest discussion of the problematic aims of science – and thus
from implementing humane aim-oriented empiricism and wisdom-
inquiry.
Boden presents us with a sharp dilemma. Accepting military funding
may be good for science, even essential, but it is also bad, because it
supports the military, and may lead to results being used by the military.
But if my remarks above are more or less correct, the dilemma may not
be quite as sharp as Boden suggests, in that military funding is not as
good for science as she indicates.
Boden knows vastly more about the history of cognitive science and
AI than I do, and she may be able to tear my remarks about the negative
influence of computers on these fields to pieces. My point, in any case,
is not that military funds only have bad effects on science, but rather that,
along with what is good, there may be bad effects as well.
Whatever conclusions one comes to concerning this matter, Boden’s
central point remains. The question of funding, especially from the
military, is absolutely crucial when it comes to the task of developing a
kind of science genuinely devoted to the best interests of humanity.
relevant fundamental theory – orthodox quantum theory (OQT) – were ignored.
OQT is defective because it fails to solve the wave/particle problem and, as a result,
is a theory only about the results of performing measurements on quantum systems.
It does not tell us what quantum systems, such as electrons and atoms, are (when not
being measured), and does not unambiguously declare whether the quantum domain
is fundamentally deterministic or probabilistic. The two most basic questions about
the nature of the quantum domain remain answered. In order to answer them, what
is needed is relatively inexpensive thought, not bigger particle accelerators (which
do not help at all). Not till the 1990s did most physicists come to appreciate that
OQT is fundamentally defective. In short, during the post-war decades, physicists
failed to tackle the intellectually difficult but inexpensive research into the defects
of OQT, and instead built ever bigger and more expensive particle accelerators. The
sheer availability of funds may have encouraged this betrayal of the Einsteinian
quest for understanding. See chapter one, note 3, for references to work on the
defects of OQT.When ought scientists to accept such funding? When one’s country is
engaged in a just war, but not otherwise?
So far I have said something about how military funding may corrupt
science. But there is another, far more important issue to discuss: the
vast size of the military in the world today, the spread of lethal
armaments, conventional and nuclear, the threat of chemical and
biological weapons, and the obscene levels of funding of the military,
especially in the US, but in other countries too, such as the UK. In the
UK, 30% of the budget for research and development is spent on the
military; in the US it is 50%.
81 As I write, the US Department of
Defence has just announced that it will invest an additional $400 million
over the next five years to support basic research at academic
institutions.
Far from enhancing the security of the globe, this vast expenditure on
the military is a global menace. The US’s military-industrial complex
spreads like a cancer through the economy. It is now, for political and
economic reasons, very difficult to dismantle or substantially diminish.
Having a military of this size makes it almost imperative that it is used,
every decade or so, to justify its existence. A war must be found to fight.
Its mere existence provokes other countries to develop their military.
Thus it was the US that intensified the arms race during the cold war, in
massively increasing its arsenal of nuclear intercontinental missiles. The
Soviet Union, initially, had far, far fewer missiles, but Khrushchev
concealed this fact in order not to lose face, and those involved in the
missile industry exploited his deception. The star wars episode during
Ronald Reagan’s presidency, is another example of scientists exploiting
the situation to obtain funds to pursue their research. This was done
quite cynically; no one – apart from Reagan himself perhaps – believed
that star wars could actually work. Now, as I write, George Bush seeks
to install star wars systems into countries on Russia’s borders, thus
provoking retaliation from Russia, which might lead to a new cold war
and arms race. Scientists have played a crucial role in these lunatic
developments.
If science is for humanity, the primary concern of scientists should be
for humanity, if the interests of science and humanity come into conflict.
The implications are, in my mind, quite clear: the scientific community
81 C. Langley, C. Soldiers in the Laboratory (Folkstone, Scientists for Global
Responsibility, 2005).must now refuse offers of funding from the military – especially in the
US and UK.
But that is not enough. Indeed, it is not even the primary issue. The
implication of my argument for humane aim-oriented empiricism is quite
clear: scientific debate and discussion needs to proceed not, as at present,
at two levels, (1) evidence, and (2) theory, but at three levels, (1), (2),
and (3) problematic aims. We urgently need to bring about a revolution
in the intellectual/institutional structure of science, so that scientists and
non-scientists engage in sustained discussion about (a) what it is
scientifically possible to discover, and (b) what it is desirable to
discover, in the hope that the highly problematic overlap of (a) and (b)
can be discovered and pursued.
Discussion of research aims and priorities must involve the public,
since scientists, however qualified to discern what is scientifically
discoverable, are not especially qualified to discern what it is of value to
discover. New institutional means need to be created to promote and
sustain such discussion. There need to be scientific/public conferences,
journals, websites, radio and TV programmes. Journalists, MPs and
other public figures need to be involved.
And this debate must include, what has been so scandalously
neglected up to the present, discussion of funding of military research,
and military funding of academic research. It is the deafening silence of
the scientific community (apart from a few exceptions
82) that is so
shocking, and so harmful.
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A long term goal must surely be to demilitarize the globe, so that,
eventually, we have police but not armies and weapons of mass
destruction. A first step would be to reduce dramatically the size of the
military in the US, and the budget for military research and development.
To this one might add world-wide nuclear disarmament. These steps
require, in my view, massive backing from academia. The US public
82 Boden tells me that the AI community objected vociferously to the “star wars”
project.
83 Boden indicates how damaging it can be for a research worker to decide, on an
individual basis, not to accept funds from the military. But instead of military
funding being resisted on an individual basis, what is required is for the discipline
as a whole to find ways to discourage such funding – at least by means of public
discussion and reporting of funding. Whether researchers should be blacklisted for
accepting funding from the military – as they would be if they faked results – is
another matter. However the issue is tackled, it would clearly be highly
controversial. Boden’s conclusion is absolutely right: there are no easy answers.needs to be educated in how dangerous the massively oversize military
is, and what needs to be done progressively to reduce its size. But I do
not see this happening without wisdom-inquiry. We are not likely to get
the military under sane control unless we have institutions of learning
rationally devoted to helping us tackle our global problems, our
problems of living, in increasingly cooperative ways.
84 Academics
urgently need to put their house in order, and do all that they can to
implement and pursue wisdom-inquiry.
Donald Gillies
Donald Gillies summarizes his earlier critique of the Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE), operative in the UK, and then goes on to
indicate how matters could be amended to improve both research and
teaching. Both his criticisms of the status quo, and his positive
proposals, seem to me to be eminently sensible. I was particularly struck
by his account of the way the RAE operates so as to encourage Mr. B,
good at teaching but bad at research, to do more research, while at the
same time encouraging Ms. A, good at research but bad at teaching, to
do more teaching. Gillies’s main criticism is, however, that the RAE is
designed to avoid the error of funding research which does not produce
anything of value, but operates in such a way that it is very likely to
commit the much more damaging error of excluding from research those
few individuals who have the capacity to do research work of immense
value.
Gillies’s proposal is that the RAE should be disbanded, and the status
of teaching should be transformed so that it becomes possible to advance
one’s career via excellence in teaching (and not just by means of
research or admin, as at present). Individuals should be free to decide
for themselves whether they wish to concentrate on teaching, research, or
admin. This might not work at present, because most academics want to
keep their teaching load as light as possible. But, Gillies argues, this
would change dramatically if teaching was perceived to be a reliable
road to promotion.
I am tempted to say that Gillies’s proposals are far too sensible and
practical to be adopted.
84 I have developed this argument in connection with the infamous “war on terror”;
see my “The Disastrous War against Terrorism: Violence versus Enlightenment” in
A. W. Merkidze, ed., Terrorism Issues: Threat, Assessment, Consequences and
Prevention (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007), ch. 3, pp. 111-133.If adopted, would they help acceptance and adoption of wisdom-
Inquiry? They might help a bit, perhaps, but not much. The chief
obstacles to the acceptance and adoption of wisdom-inquiry by the
academic community are, it seems to me, those that I indicated in my
From Knowledge to Wisdom. As I have already mentioned, there is what
I have called “the lobster pot effect”: standard empiricism, once adopted,
shields itself from effective criticism by restricting the intellectual
domain of science to testable claims to knowledge (and that which bears
on such claims). Criticisms of standard empiricism, arguments for what
purports to be an improved conception of science, do not qualify for
entry, and are excluded from science. The philosophy of science is not,
at present, an integral part of science (as AOE requires it to be). Again,
knowledge-inquiry, being built into the institutional structure of
academe, determines what is to count as a contribution to academic
thought. It determines criteria for publication, for academic excellence,
and thus influences such things as promotions, careers, status, prizes,
funds for research. Senior academics will tend to be resistant to the idea
that what decides these important features of academic life – the aim and
methods of academic inquiry – needs to be transformed. Again, what
opposition there is to knowledge-inquiry tends to express itself as anti-
rationalism, social constructivism, doubts about the reality or value of
scientific knowledge and progress. This has led to a backlash from those
defending scientific rationality, the authenticity and value of science.
The resulting “science wars” debate has led to orthodox positions
becoming all the more firmly entrenched. Both sides in the debate miss
the crucial point that “scientific rationality”, so called, is actually a
characteristic kind of irrationality masquerading as rationality, there
being an urgent need to develop a more rigorous kind of science, and
academic inquiry more generally, of greater value when judged from
both intellectual and humanitarian standpoints. Standard empiricism and
knowledge-inquiry are not, of course, taught explicitly; they are rather
implicit in everything that is taught – implicit in much that goes on in
universities. These doctrines become deeply ingrained habits of thought
as a result, difficult to dislodge, call into question, and revise. Again,
rampant specialization tends to make academics responsible for their
own speciality, but indifferent to questions about the value, the integrity,
of academic inquiry considered as a whole. No one takes responsibility
for the intellectual and human value of the entire academic enterprise,
and there is no arena for the expression of such responsibility, suchconcerns, should they be felt. It is as if everyone has decided, long ago,
that the proper basic task of academia is to amass more and more
specialized knowledge, this being so utterly obvious, so wholly beyond
all possible doubt, that it can be placed permanently in limbo, ignored
and forgotten.
85 But just occasionally, as Gillies in effect reminds us,
such elementary, banal truisms turn out to be nothing of the kind.
Sometimes, what everyone ignores ought to receive the most active
attention.
Gillies’s proposals would return us to a slightly improved version of
what prevailed when I began my academic career in the mid 1960s –
improved because greater emphasis would be placed on the value of, and
the career rewards to be had from, teaching. But in the 1960s,
knowledge-inquiry was even more firmly in place than it is nowadays, in
2008.
85 For these points see my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1
st ed., pp. 45-46, 123-124;
2
nd ed., pp. 7-9, 58-59, 134-135 and 305-306; “Science, Reason, Knowledge and
Wisdom: A Criticism of Specialism”, op. cit. See too works referred to in note 47.